SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and
Performance Prior to 9-11
A Report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Minority Leader
July 2002
REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO 9-11
SUBMITTED BY MR. CHAMBLISS OF GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN
MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker ofthe House Of Representatives
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with your instructions, and those of the Democratic Leader, we hereby submit this report of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The Subcommittee was established at your direction as a bipartisan 'working group' in January 2001 with a mandate to make recommendations on how to improve America's counterterrorism and homeland security capabilities. It was later given the responsibility to investigate the intelligence deficiencies that existed on September 11, 2001, and its status changed to that of a subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee.
We subsequently set about evaluating the performance of the three key agencies charged with protecting America from the scourge of terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This report represents our findings on the gaps in the aforementioned agencies counterterrorism capabilities prior to 9-11, and makes specific recommendations on how those gaps should be addressed. Because of your expressed desire to improve Congressional oversight of counterterrorism and homeland security, we have also included our assessment of the current oversight situation in the House on these issues, and have offered options for streamlining and enhancing the quality of oversight.
Additional information on terrorism and homeland security matters has been included to provide you with a useful reference aid.
It has been our honor to serve in this bipartisan capacity in support of the security of all Americans. We will continue to provide you and Leader Gephardt with our assessments, in various forms, of key issues related to the war on terrorism during the remainder of the 107th Congress and for as long as our work remains useful to you.
Respectfully submitted,
Saxby Chambliss
Chairman
Jane Harman
Ranking Democrat
cc: The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt
______________________________________________________________
CIA did not sufficiently penetrate the al-Qa'ida organization before September llth. Because of the perceived reduction in the threat environment in the early to mid 1990s, and the concomitant reduction in resources for basic human intelligence collection, there were fewer operations officers, fewer stations, fewer agents, and fewer intelligence reports produced. This likely gave CIA fewer opportunities for accessing agents useful in the counterterrorism campaign and eroded overall capabilities.
Several management decisions also likely degraded CIA's CT capabilities by, for example, redirecting funds earmarked for core field collection and analysis to headquarters; paying insufficient attention to CIA's unilateral CT capability; relying too much on liaison for CT; and neglecting sufficient investment of foreign language training and exploitation. The dramatic increase in resources for intelligence since 9-11 improves the outlook for CIA's CT capabilities, but only if CIA management acknowledges and deals with the systemic problems outlined in this report.
http://www.fas.org/i...ci_ths0702.html
FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have been labeled
as a major intelligence failure, similar in magnitude to that associated with the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.2 In response to criticisms of its role in this failure,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms to
transform the bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on
criminal investigations into a more mobile, agile, flexible, intelligence-driven3
agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were sparked by
congressional charges that the Intelligence Community (IC),5 including the FBI,
missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt the September 11 attacks on New
York City and Washington.
http://fpc.state.gov...ation/39334.pdf