Part 2 of this post series will address the second bullet point from my first post.
- The actual RGS used for uplink attempts by the DSP (ARINC) can be the same RGS as predicted by the airline, but it often isn't the same.
This will require a bit of a rehashing from information that Warren Stutt has already described over on the P4T forum, but I'll add a little more detail to help clarify his fine work with more documentation from ARINC Specifications 618-5 and 620-4.
For the sake of illustration, I'll use the last message that was acknowledged as received for United Airlines Flight 93.
From pages 127 and 128 of
5 AWA 898 Printout of ARINC messages.pdf, in agreeance with page 4 of
t-0148-911MFR-01098.pdf, we see that the last downlink acknowledgment from UA93 was from message #17 noted in the Knerr/Winter interview on page 57 of
Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf. This acknowledgement is listed in MFR-01098 with a time stamp of 1351:58 Zulu, or 9:51:58 Eastern.
From the
Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf Winter states:
Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.
This is the message as formatted on page 48 in the
Team7_Box13_UAL_ACARS.pdf:
DDLXCXA CHIAK CHI68R
.CHIAKUA 111351/ED
AGM
AN N591UA/GL FWA
- UA93 EWRSFO
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
LAND ASP AT NEAREST --NEAREST AIRPORT.ASP .ASP ON GROND.ANYWERE.
CHIDD ED BALLINGER
;09111351 108575 0676
And this is how it was formatted on page 127 in
Warren's PDF:
FLoc=352538978 AJPSBcnt= 273 ULMSG S=31 D=21 BEPts=20010911 13:51:53
ADNS MsgLen= 216 Org Addr= CHIAKUA Org TimeStamp= 20010911 13:51:00
Smi= AGM AgyNum= 65535
Tail Number= .N591UA FltID= UA0093
Target Stn= FWA<00><00> Target Method= 2
<CR><LF>
<SOH>QU DDLXCXA<CR><LF>
.CHIAKUA 111351/ED <CR><LF>
<STX>AGM<CR><LF>
AN N591UA/GL FWA<CR><LF>
- UA93 EWRSFO<CR><LF>
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -<CR><LF>
LAND ASP AT NEAREST --NEAREST AIRPORT.ASP .ASP ON GROND.ANYWER<TSTRET>
E.<CR><LF>
<CR><LF>
CHIDD ED BALLINGER <CR><LF>
<ETX><EOT>
The more astute of readers might make note of the sending time stamps for the above message is indicated as BEPts 13:51:53 and Org TimeStamp 13:51:00. Some might think that this message doesn't match with the previously mentioned 1351:58 Zulu from the MFR-01098, but keep in mind that the MFR is talking about the downlink message as depicted a little later in this post, not the uplink message as is depicted above.
We can see that the predicted RGS sent by the GL text element as provided by the airline was the RGS station in Fort Wayne Indiana; FWA. This is wholly consistent with the original flight plan for United 93 and where the aircraft would have been at around 9:51 Eastern if it had not been hijacked. The ULBLK which follows this entry didn't route through FWA, however. Instead, it routed to the aircraft through PIT based on the DSP's dynamically updated routing table as we can see in the ULBLK message below it.
FLoc=352565664 AJPSBcnt= 254 ULBLK S=31 D=21 BEPts=20010911 13:51:56
UL MsgLen= 213 Stn= PITC6 StnDelivType= 1
Tail= .N591UA Fid= UA0093
<SOH>2.N591UA<NAK>C1A<STX>.CHIAKUA 111351/ED <CR><LF>
AGM<CR><LF>
AN N591UA/GL FWA<CR><LF>
- UA93 EWRSFO<CR><LF>
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -<CR><LF>
LAND ASP AT NEAREST --NEAREST AIRPORT.ASP .ASP ON GROND.ANYWER<TSTRET>
E.<CR><LF>
<CR><LF>
CHIDD ED BALLINGER <CR><LF>
<ETX>
Below that we can see the acknowledgment message from the aircraft was received by not just one, but multiple RGS locations. And the first acknowledgement, as corroborated by the
MFR-01098 PDF has a time stamp of 1351:58 Zulu.
and
Reviewing all of the other successfully uplinked messages in the same PDF we can see that this is consistent. This is an indication that the aircraft was operating in a Category A network. If it were a Category B network, only one RGS should receive the message. There are other indications as well, but I'll get into that later in a supplemental post; unless Cz points it out before me.
Now, Balsamo has claimed that the RGS stations referenced in the DLBLKs in this document from Warren aren't actually front end RGS stations. He claims that because the RGS identifiers are followed by suffixes they are Back End Processing routers. He even cites his very own self-proclaimed ACARS expert (one Dennis Cimino) to corroborate this claim. My initial questions to Balsamo and Cimino would be:
- If BepStnName stands for Back End Processing router Station Name, as your claim seems to suggest, what does BEPts stand for in the message headers for each message in that PDF? Does it stand for Back End Processing router Time Stamp? Don't get me wrong, I do think there is a Back End involved with this claim, but I don't think it is the kind that Balsamo is suggesting...
- If a suffixed RGS station, like PITC6 for example, is not an actual front end RGS station, why does line two of the above referenced ULBLK message specifically indicate that Stn= PITC6 had a StnDelivType= 1? It doesn't refer to it as BepStnName, it refers to it as simply Stn, and it follows by what is obviously depicting a Station Delivery Type of 1. If this station didn't uplink the message, which station did? It certainly wasn't FWA because we have already established that /GL FWA is merely the predicted station as provided by the airline when the message was originally sent from United's dispatch and is not directly related to the actual RGS used for uplink unless very specific conditions apply; which they did not at this point by your own admission.
Perhaps one of his cronies can deliver some answers to these questions, but I don't suggest than anyone hold their breath.
In the mean time I think that Cz has offered a much more reasonable and plausible possible explanation for this suffix in a PM and I'll quote him here:
Czero 101, on 15 December 2011 - 02:40 AM, said:
Also, regarding Balsamo stating that "PITC6" isn't the PIT RGS:
I did some time on a jury for a murder a few years back and one aspect of the case had us being informed by an expert on certain aspects of how Cell Towers work.
One of the things we learned is that the towers almost always have multiple transceivers to allow for complete and overlapping 360 degree coverage. Info showing which tower and which specific transceiver handled a call was presented to us so as to show how the accused's movements were tracked by the Telco and the Police.
My first thought on seeing "Stn=PITC6" was that it was indicating the specific transceiver on the PIT RGS that was used to either transmit or receive the message. Most likely it refers to the receiving transceiver, imo...
This possible explanation makes perfect sense to me. Is it definitive and irrefutably sourced by ARINC documentation? Not so far as I've found, but it certainly makes a lot more sense than Balsamo and crew's interpretation.
As an added note, this PM also included Cz's suspicion that the SSV indication in those DLBLK messages most likely represent some kind of signal strength verification which is used by the DSP for prioritizing in its routing table. I concur that this is highly likely, though I haven't found specific documentation which details the meaning of this acronym either. The interpretation does appear to match when you review the prior DLBLK messages with the highest SSV value and the subsequent uplink routing decisions throughout the PDF. I haven't reviewed every instance, but each one I've looked at has matched this expectation and it lends significant credibility to this interpretation in my opinion. I briefly mentioned this signal strength in my prior post to Q24 but I didn't properly credit Cz for the idea, so I will now. And yes, he has given me permission to quote from our PMs about this subject for any who are wondering.
You may not have noticed, but I've been a bit side tracked in the previous paragraphs. I'll get back to the bullet point in question, which is that the actual RGS used for uplink attempts by the DSP (ARINC) can be the same RGS as predicted by the airline, but it often isn't the same. I've illustrated one example above with Ballinger's message 0676, let's briefly look at a few more from
Warren's PDF.
Regarding American Airlines Flight 11:
Pages 52 and 53 show that the predicted GL RGS was ALB, but that the actual ULBLK RGS utilized was LGA.
Pages 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 show that the predicted GL RGS was BUF, but that the actual ULBLK RGS utilized was also LGA.
Also notice that there are no DLBLK messages after the reported crash time for AA11 of 8:46:30. Pages 59 to 65 give us summaries of all attempted uplinks after that time with a Reason Code for failure of 311. This Reason Code is documented in ARINC 620-4 as No ACK (No response from aircraft) on page 145 (page 153 of the PDF) in table 2-3 from Attachment 2:
If you fully review this PDF supplied by Warren you'll find that this Reason Code is listed for most of the messages addressed to each aircraft included in the PDF after the reported crash times. I suppose that might be because they had crashed...
Regarding United Airlines Flight 93, whose messages begin on page 66:
The first divergence between the predicted RGS and actual ULBLK delivery RGS comes after the last crew initiated downlink at 13:26:10 on page 103, when they requested - /C4 EWRSFO ED COFIRM LATEST MSG PLZ
The uplink divergences from here are hard to follow, but I'll briefly list them.
Page 108 shows that the predicted GL RGS was CAK, but page 109 shows that the actual ULBLK RGS utilized for uplink at 13:32:02 was PIT.
This trend continues on pages 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, and 117 which show all ULBLK messages as being routed through PIT.
Pages 118, 119, 120, 121 show ULMSGs predicted to route through CLE but that were actually routed through PIT with the ULBLKs.
Pages 123, 124, and 125 show ULMSGs predicted to route through TOL but that were actually routed through PIT.
Page 126 introduces the first prediction of FWA, and the actual routing utilized was through PIT, and we come full circle on page 127 with the originally referenced example that I described earlier in the post; the final acknowledged message from UA93.
Attempted uplinks continue through page 136 and the failed Reason Codes mentioned before likewise continue through page 133: 311 No ACK (No response from aircraft). Pages 134 through 136 give Reason Code 231 No Station To (No tracking available and neither GL nor AP appear).
Regarding American Airlines Flight 77, whose messages begin on page 137:
As with the other flights, the divergence between the predicted GL RGS provided by the airline's text elements begins after the aircraft was hijacked. The first divergence I noted in Warren's PDF was on page 191; the predicted RGS was CRW, but the actual ULBLK RGS was HTS at 12:59:45.
Then on pages 194, 195, 196, 197, and 199 we see several instances where the predicted RGS was CVG and the actual was HTS.
In light of the above information, perhaps I slightly mis-worded that second bullet point. It should probably actually read:
- The actual RGS used for uplink attempts by the DSP (ARINC) can be the same RGS as predicted by the airline, but it often isn't the same in the event that the target aircraft has been hijacked and diverted from its original course with the intention of crashing into a building.
At any rate, I think this point has been well established and you might notice that I partially covered the third bullet point as well. In the next post I'll finish up the third bullet and perhaps add some more references to help clarify other points and ACARS as a whole.
Cheers
Edit: Typo
Edited by booNyzarC, 16 December 2011 - 04:42 PM.