LG
OK, it's probably best to recap a bit. As it happens, I wandered into a conversation between Arbenol68 and Seeker79, in which Arbie said:
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For many believers the assumption of god's existence is based on a concrete and unwavering certainty that their deity of choice exists. No atheist can logically argue that their assumption has that level of certainty.
So you can see that he disagrees with Dawkins about the existence of "7's" but does agree with Dawkins that believers (many believers) can experience certainty in their opinion.
Before Dawkins came up, I asked Arbie how he could know the mental state of another,
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I missed how you would know that "many believers" have different credal experiences than any atheist. Interpersonal comparisons like that are very difficult in principle, and I'd be curious to know how you've solved this problem, which so many others find impossible.
To which Arbie answered by proposing an experiment that I "ask a believer how certain they are that their god exists."
I found the answer unsatisfactory, since this cannot possibly tell me anything about the relative level of confidence the believer feels, which supposedly no atheist can logically argue that their assumption has that level of certainty.
Then, a particular atheist, Richard Dawkins, was quoted as saying that
some other atheist or atheists have what is logically the highest possible level of certainty, although Dawkins declined to name names. Instead, he named a non-atheist who expresed the required level of confidence, but in a different kind of proposition altogether.
Little wonder, then, that matters are a bit confusing. Turning to issues in your latest post, then:
The significance I find in spontaneous verbal self-reports is that they do not impart enough inforamtion about internal private mental experience for anybody - not Arbie, not me, and not Richard Dawkins - to compare the quality or intensity of these experiences between different people.
It may well be that people who hold one kind of opinion will characteristically choose different words to describe themselves and their experiences than people who hold an incomaptible kind of opinion. But whether they do or not,
No spontaneous free-text verbal self-report, or collection of them, will validly support the kind of interpersonal comparisons that either Arbie or Dawkins proposes.
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Interesting, I could definitely use some more detail on this. I'm not sure I use the phrase 'something that happened to them' to describe obtaining the knowledge that the moon is millions of miles away, are you referring instead to some event or religious experience that caused them to believe?
But you yourself were kind enough to provide an example immediately before that, in a religious context. One of your believers said, empahsis added,
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"There would be absolutely NO PROOF that could be shown to me that could make me deny my entire past and all the things God has done in my life."
I am unsure whether any people learning academic subjects have that kind of experience or not. I agree that learning is a kind of opinion formation, but I just don't know if it has the same qualities as abstracting an opinion about God from a lifetime of personal experiences.
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Okay, maybe it's starting to sink in more; we can't know for sure what a believer really means by 'I know with absolute certainty that God exists' and so it may actually be equivalent to the atheist position after all?
Yes!
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Do you think mental states can be compared at all and if so, what is required?
Sure, sometimes, with some granularity, and about some mental states. That's what they do every business day on Wall Street, or in the sports book shops in Vegas or London.
Some people are also gifted or trained in expressing their confidence within some standardized formal system, like probability. Unfortunately, the people who are really good at that tend not to be prominent atheists or believers. And prominent or not, what with all that unusual attention to articulating their interior mental states rigorously, they may be atypical in their belief or disbelief.
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Is it unreasonable to believe that some percentage of the people who are saying that they are close-minded to contrary evidence actually are communicating their mental state accurately?
I am reluctant to call anybody's consistent personal beliefs "unreasonable." I am skeptical about it though. For example, that one of your believers who said
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"There would be absolutely NO PROOF that could be shown to me ...
Is that the same credal state, or a different credal state, from another (?) believer who said,
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... if there had been any reasonable conclusive evidence to disprove this, it would have surfaced long before now."
The latter sounds quite reasonable and routine: it's a prediction about the future state of the evidence, and making such predictions is a function of belief. The other may or may not be reasonable, depending on what the speaker meant by that "would ... absolutely ... could" sequence. Is that also a prediction, or is it a claim of logical necessity - or what? I get that the chosen believers have more bluster than selected atheists might have, but the question was whether they had more confidence. And that question stands unanswered from these snippets, IMO.
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I read part of your link, and it certainly seems to me that Jung was unclear that what he meant by 'God' is not what 99% of the population means by 'God'. It says that the BBC received many letters after he said "I know", and I think he offered some more clarification, so apparently it wasn't only Dawkins who was thinking differently (it's tough to tell, that article mentions multiple interviews simultaneously).
First, Jung disagrees with you about what 99% of the population means by 'God.' Maybe he's right, maybe you're right, but obviously, Jung's beliefs will be what drives Jung's testimony about his own beliefs. Otherwise, we can stop right there and say that Jung's testimony is uninformative about his beliefs, and so Dawkins erred to use Jung's testimony at all.
Jung said substantially the same thing, what Dawkins cites, at least three times: in a
Time magazine interview, a few years later in a television interview, and a few months after that in a letter to the BBC, who had run the TV interview. The only time there was any widespread confusion reported was after the TV interview.
The source of that confusion, IMO, was the sequence of questions (over which Jung had no control) that made it appear that Jung could be saying something we know that he didn't intend. Jung truthfully answered each question as it was presented to him, without an on camera opportunity to reconcile the individual answers. That was the source of the confusion, not anything that Jung did personally and could have done otherwise.
Dawkins is a professional scholar. Jung's statement to the BBC is the definitive resolution of what his words meant. What Jung wrote to the BBC was fully consistent with what
Time reported him to have said to them a few years before. Dawkins purported to know Jung's state of mind. It is obvious that Dawkins erred, and that in order to err, Dawkins had to overlook both the
Time and the
Listener written statements.
If some internet blogger can find them, then how could Dawkins, an Oxford professor, miss them? There was no compelling reason for Dawkins to mention Jung's religious opinions. Jung is not a "7." Jung is, however, a recognized expert in psychology. Dawkins introduced him solely because some words that Jung uttered, three times no less, could be divorced from their context, also three times, and made to appear to lend elite expert support to Dawkins' otherwise speculative and unsupported point about the existence of "7's."
I call them as I see them. That's what quote mining looks like.