CIA Report Blames Tenet for 9/ll Failure
Former CIA director George Tenet "bears ultimate responsibility" for failing to create a strategic plan to stop al Qaeda prior to 9/ll, according to a review by the CIA’s inspector general that was made public today, more than two years after it was written. The report says that while Tenet wrote he wanted "no resources or people spared" in going after al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, neither he, nor his deputy, "followed up these warnings...
http://abcnews.go.co...ia-report-blam/
The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Congressional Hearings and the Status of the Investigation
Committee Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations and Additional Views of the Vice Chairman
On December 10, 2002, the two intelligence committees released a series of
findings, conclusions, and recommendations pending release of a complete report
when security review is completed. In addition, Senator Shelby, the Vice Chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made public an extensive statement of his
additional views. These documents are available on the web site of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
In large measure, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations are consistent
with Ms. Hill’s earlier public assessments. The findings emphasize that no agency
had information on the time, place, or specific nature of the attacks. They describe,
however, specific information that was available to agencies and “that appears
relevant to the events of September 11” but was not fully exploited. The findings
further suggested systemic weaknesses of intelligence and law enforcement
communities: an absence of emphasis on the counterterrorist mission, a decline in
funding, limited use of information technology, poor inter-agency coordination,
insufficient analytic focus and quality, and inadequate human intelligence. Above
all, there was a lack of a government-wide strategy for acquiring and analyzing
intelligence and for acting on it to eliminate or reduce terrorist threats.
On the basis of these findings, the two intelligence committees made a number
of recommendations, including the creation of a Cabinet-level position of Director
of National Intelligence, separate from the position of Director of the CIA, who
would establish priorities for collection, analysis, and dissemination throughout the
Intelligence Community and manage and oversee the execution of Intelligence
Community budgets. Also included was a recommendation calling for a
government-wide strategy for combating terrorism prepared by the NSC with an
intelligence component prepared by the Director of National Intelligence.
A number of recommendations centered on the newly-established Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), which should become “an effective all-source
terrorism information fusion center that will dramatically improve the focus and
quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant
intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31650.pdf