QUOTE (turbonium @ Jan 19 2008, 04:03 AM)

No. The rest would be busy building what they hoped would be functioning, operational Moonships, able to withstand the very little understood environment of the lunar mission.
"very little understood"? Hardly...
Pioneer 4, 1959 - Lunar Flyby
Ranger 4, 1962 - Lunar Imapctor
Ranger 5, 1962 - Lunar Flyby
Ranger 7, 1964 - Lunar Impactor
Ranger 8, 1964 - Lunar Impactor
Ranger 9, 1964 - Lunar Impactor
Surveyor 1, 1966 - Lunar Lander
Surveyor 3, 1967 - Lunar Lander
Surveyor 5, 1967 - Lunar Lander
Surveyor 6, 1967 - Lunar Lander
Surveyor 7, 1968 - Lunar Lander
Lunar Orbiter 1 - 5, 1966 - 68 - Lunar Orbiters
Explorer 35, 1967 - 73 - Lunar Orbiter
QUOTE
To say that by 1968-69, we "had built a wealth of knowledge" on what a manned lunar mission would encounter
They say it because they did:
Explorer 1, 1957 - Discovered Van Allen Belt
Explorer 3, 1958 - Studied energy particles
Explorer 4, 1958 - Studied energy particles
Explorer 6 (SA-2), 1959 - Studied magnetosphere
Explorer 7 (SA-1a), 1959 - Studied energy particles
Explorer 8 (S-56), 1960 - Studied composition of ionosphere
Explorer 10 (P-14), 1961 - Investigated Earth's magnetic field
Explorer 12 (EPE A), 1961 - Energetic particle research
Explorer 14 (EPE B ), 1962 - Energetic particle research
Explorer 15 (EPE C), 1962 - Energetic particle research
Explorer 18 (IMP A), 1963 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 20 (IE A), 1964 - Ionospheric research
Explorer 21 (IMP B ), 1964 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 22 (BE B (S-66)), 1964 - Ionospheric research
Explorer 25 (Injun 4 (IE B )), 1964 - Ionospheric research
Explorer 26 (EPE D), 1964 - High energy particle observation
Explorer 27 (IMP C), 1965 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 28 (IMP D), 1965 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 31 (DME A), 1965 - Ionospheric research
Explorer 33 (IMP D), 1966 - Magnetospheric research (did not attain lunar orbit)
Explorer 34 (IMP F), 1967 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 35 (IMP E), 1967 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 40 (Injun 5 (IE C)), 1968 - Magnetospheric research
------ Missions after Apollo 8 ------
Explorer 41 (IMP G), 1969 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 43 (IMP H), 1971 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 45 (SSS A), 1971 - Magnetospheric research
Explorer 47 (IMP I), 1972 - Magnetospheric research
So, yes, there was extensive knowledge of the Van Allen Belts, the Magnetosphere and the radiation environment between the Earth and the Moon.
QUOTE
we wouldn't need to spend $47 million trying to get the "wealth of knowledge" out there that we still don't have yet, but that we will need to get, before we can ever - ahem - "return" to the moon!
That was answered a few times, a few pages back:
http://www.unexplained-mysteries.com/forum...t&p=2099213http://www.unexplained-mysteries.com/forum...t&p=2101079http://www.unexplained-mysteries.com/forum...t&p=2101101http://www.unexplained-mysteries.com/forum...t&p=2101120QUOTE
The sheer brilliance of this plan is that NASA was able to use the genuine elements to 'disappear', totally out of sight into LEO, which allowed them to hoax everything else in complete privacy, because we had no way of independently observing and verifying whether or not these 'final stages' of the event were indeed genuine.
And you have proof, evidence, any information at all of this other than your opinion...?
QUOTE
How would anybody at Grumman know whether the LM would be able to hover above the lunar surface, and gently land on the moon? And how would they know if the upper section would lift them off the lunar surface, and then be maneuvered into a precise docking with the CM, in lunar orbit?
Because, uhm.. they studied it and together with NASA, invented the procedures, systems and technology to do it.
Have a look at the documentation contained on TNT's page here:
http://www.landingapollo.com/documentation/lunarmodule.phpIts a listing of documents (.pdf's) available on the web that detail a lot of things regarding the LM and its development program
QUOTE
Grumman had no way of first-hand testing / observing the LM, within the same environment it was intended to perform
This is true, until Apollo 5, 9 and 10. Prior to that they had extensive testing and simulations.
Excerpts from a
1966 interview with Tom Kelly:
QUOTE
Well, one of the things they decided to explore was how you should actually conduct the mission, because this wasn't really covered in the -- in the Apollo RFQ at all. You were just told to propose on a particular vehicle, and it was just sort of loosely implied how the mission would be conducted. So, to come to the point, as a side operation and part of the basic GE team Apollo Program, there was a side group set up to look at various mission alternatives. And, there were five mission alternatives that were looked at, at that time. And, they just sort of drew out, among the teams, who would work on what by lots, and the Grumman team got to work on lunar orbital rendezvous, which was a very interesting choice. Because, at the end of the study period, we had to get together, and we compared what Douglas had done on their assigned mission, and what GE had done on theirs, and we all agreed that -- yeah, the way to do this mission was lunar orbital rendezvous. So, that was the recommended mission that went in as a part of that Apollo proposal. Well, as you can imagine, that sort of whetted our appetite here at Grumman, and after the Apollo proposal was turned in and done with, why, we went right ahead with these LOR studies, which were pointing to the design of something like a LEM at that time.
And, then when the decision was announced on the Apollo and it was clear that we weren't in on the CSM part of the Apollo, why, we devoted all the efforts then of our space study group, at that time, to the LEM concept. And the design concept, initially, was an extremely simple thing -- it was like a fellow sitting on a pair of handle bars, very much. But, it grew and grew, conceptually, until finally in our studies, we were -- oh, I guess, this was about April, say, of 1962, or so. By that time we were studying LEM type vehicles in a parametric form, looking at all different combinations, whether it should be a staged or unstaged vehicle; or what kind of engine complement it should have; do you really need throttleable engines, or could you use several discrete levels of engines; what kind of landing gear should you have on this thing, etc. We also, during that time, worked out all the weight tradeoff factors, which was to serve us in good stead later on, because it was obvious that was the dominating characteristic of the whole design.
So, anyway, when the RFQ for the LEM came out, why, I'd say that we were pretty well prepared. We had done an awful lot of background work and condensed it as well as we could in the RFQ. The reason that I was looking for the proposal is I wanted to show you what the vehicle looked like originally - it conceptually is the same as it is today, but, in almost every significant detail, it is different. And, there are reasons for all the differences.
QUOTE
What they wanted to launch into, and what they subsequently directed us to launch into, was an extensive preliminary design phase wherein every aspect of the design was gone over again, and just from a conceptual standpoint. And, oh, that phase, I would say, lasted from -- we started in January 1963 was when we officially got under contract and we were still, grossly, preliminary designing the vehicle for at least nine months after that; swapping tanks around, changing the number of landing gear, changing the shape of the cabin, and all that sort of thing.
QUOTE
ERTEL: The interface you had with Link on the simulator gave quite a bit of input into....
KELLY: Well, yes, Link is actually a subcontractor of ours, so, essentially, we give them direction, and information, they need in order to build the simulator.
ERTEL: I was wondering if it comes from here job responsibilities-- I mentioned, as one of the best contract awards -- just like turn another shoulder, and keep on "horning it."
KELLY: Yes, we have a training equipment operation that handles this, and, well, the simulator has been another case in point where it's a real complicated device -- this simulator, very fancy, and can do a lot of things, but it has a long-lead time on getting it developed and built, and, consequently, the need for information -- firm information -- for the simulator has outstripped our ability to provide it, because we didn't even have the firm information for the flight vehicle, when we needed it for the simulator. So, we have had to work out a deal there where we just froze the information level at a particular level, and we're building the simulators to that, and we are going to upgrade and update them, with modification kit that is coming along later. But, there wasn't much alternative on that sort of thing.
QUOTE
The other thing that has changed, which I didn't mention in the history here; but there has been quite an evolution in the required development test program on this vehicle. We started out with an extremely thorough test program, I mean, you would call it methodical, and, also, idealistic. We were going to do everything on an absolutely minimum risk basis, both from a technical standpoint, and a dollar risk. And, we've had to back off on some of those ideas under the press of schedules, dollar limitations, and what have you. I still think we have a very adequate program, but it's been scaled down quite a bit from the original version, and, consequently, every time you change one of these programs, why, you change the GSE requirements, because the GSE is also tied to the particular site, and the particular way you are going to run the test.
ERTEL: I believe that there was even some LEM tests figured in the Little Joe Program at the start.
KELLY: Yes, we had some Little Joe tests originally, and, oh, one thing we did in the first year of the program was -- we had a side group working very intensively at how far -- how could you simulate the lunar landing situation on earth; what was the best way to do it; could you do it with real hardware, and with a real flight vehicle, and did it pay to do it this way, etc. We went into that for well over a year . In the beginning of the program, everyone had an intuitive feel that -- gee, we ought to be able to rig up something with a helicopter, suspending of a LEM from a helicopter, or a balloon, or something like the Langley landing rig; there ought to be someway of taking a real vehicle and flying it down to touchdown, just as though it were on the moon.
Well, we finally figured out ways to do it, all right, from a technical standpoint; but it was an extremely expensive proposition, and there was still deficiencies in the simulation. We had one rig where you would have turbojet engines that would support five-sixth of the vehicle's weight, and the LEM would fly on gimbals inside that. Any scheme that you worked out, to try to simulate the lunar gravitational field on earth, tended to be very complicated, if you did it with a real LEM. The original idea was to land a real LEM. It turned out to be extremely complicated; they all had certain technical deficiencies - you couldn't say, well, now we've got it, we're absolutely simulating the moon - it still wasn't quite right, and we could also show that, in most cases, this device couldn't do the most critical type of maneuvers. For some reasons, or other, and they differed depending on the type of scheme you had in mind. You couldn't simulate the most difficult aspects of the mission.
So the conclusion that we came up with, and I guess this was a joint Grumman-NASA conclusion, after about a year of real heavy preliminary design work on this type of flying-landing vehicle, was that it was technically feasible to produce a limited approach to a free-flight landing vehicle simulation. But, if you tried to assess it on any sort of cost effectiveness yardsticks, and compare it with what you could get with a straight fixed-base simulation, it just didn't look like it paid. You were talking hundreds of millions of dollars before you were through with this thing, and it was a dead end. So, it was washed out of the program -- but after a lot of careful thought.
And, what we have in its place, of course, is we have a pretty good fixed base simulation program, like the old Link trainer, but with a pretty good visual display, and a real good mathematical simulation of the vehicle, and we can hook certain of the flight control hardware into this rig. Our FMES (Full Mission Engineering Simulator) will be operational in about another two months, and this is our final step in the progression. We've had several different levels of engineering simulators, starting out with a simple one that we could build quickly, and working up into quite a pair of quite good ones last year, but were still limited strictly to simulation. Now, this FMES will have the capability to do a complete mission from end to end, which the others couldn't do -- the others were all pieced together. And, also, on the FMES, we can hook in the hardware -- the critical hardware in the flight control system -- the autopilot type equipment can be hooked in and actually fly with the FMES, with the computer closing the vehicle dynamic loop. So, this is what we have, and it's a good engineering tool, and is a pretty good pilot training tool, crew training tool. Of course, for crew training, this is augmented by the Link mission simulator, which is really a trainer with a lot of capability. It can simulate malfunctions of all types, etc. That was kind of an interesting historical side line, I think.
EDITED for typos...