QUOTE(hechtal @ Nov 23 2005, 04:51 AM) [snapback]945356[/snapback]
I find it somewhat amusing that once again folks are trying to sell our forerunners short. The reason that the Lunar missions ended was twofold - the US had nothing left to outdo the russians, and the cost was getting too great. You can only collect so many moon rocks. These aren't opinions, which I have read a lot of on this thread. These are facts.
As far as the time lapse for new Lunar missions, times are different. The space shuttle can't land on the moon, so scientists have to start from the ground up on a new vehicle design. Will it launch from the earth? Will it be assembled in space? How will it land on the moon in a way that is safe and efficient? How can we integrate new technology into this machine? Think of how long it took to develop the space shuttle, one of, if not the most, complex machine ever created.
Look at how long the shuttle missions were delayed after all the problems with the foam striking the underside. Times have changed, and NASA/the US isn't willing to put as much at risk as they did in the 1960's. People don't seem to realise the gravity [no pun intended] of the space race, and what it meant to get a leg up on the russians. Today's theme is quite different - international cooperation, and doing things the right way.
Of course it's your right to believe that the landings never took place. It's just sad that you can't logically process the facts, instead choosing to grasp at straws, trying to find a flaw. Believe it or not, NASA and the astronauts of the Apollo missions achieved great things, not just for the US, but for the world.
You speak of some complex items here. I appreciate your position, and essentially agree with you. I'd like to expand on a couple of your points.
There were several factors, all of which interwound to cause Apollo's demise, and which influenced the fact that we didn't continue with space exploration. It's difficult to put it all into a simple nut shell and say "that's the reason".
The primary thrust of Apollo at its genesis was to create something that would position the United States in a position of superiority to the Soviets. This cannot be denied. Of course, Apollo became much more than that, especially in the hearts of those involved with it.
As of Apollo 8, we were decidedly ahead of the Soviets, as we had in fact gone to the Moon. As of Apollo 11's launch, we had won, as the Soviet lunar capabilty had been destroyed. All we had to do was to do it. We did, of course, and continued the program as designed for a time, gradually scrapping missions because of Nixon's cuts of what would've been the final 3 Apollo lunar landing missions. This process was spurred on by the ever present American ability to became jaded and blase about the extraordinary in rapid fashion.
Money was needed for the still escalating war in Viet Nam, which was a primary reason for the cuts that pre-empted Apollo's planned conclusion. It also pre-empted most of the advanced Apollo Applications program, any hope of continuing manned space exploration for decades to come, and even compromised the Space Shuttle design process, which resulted in the vehicle we finally flew in 1981, and which has killed 14 people since.
The cost of Apollo was only getting too great because other things were costing far too much.
The time lapse which has occurred is not so much due to the time required to develop new technologies. We had the technologies in place to develop new spacecraft and new missions in the 1970s. We simply couldn't do it because we essentially weren't allowed to. The government didn't want that, and the people didn't care either.
Of course, today, we now have a new plan to return to the moon, but as you say, that requires money, and time to develop many new spacecraft, since there's been a 30-some year gap between the Apollo program and the new project.
Incidentally, this new plan does involve earth launching and assembly on the ground. The landing mode is well understood, and it seems somewhat remarkable that very similar approaches are to be used to the original EOR plan that was scrapped in the 1960s in favor of the more efficient LOR mode that we used so successfully. I question this approach, and marvel at the fact that the Shuttle seems to play no role in this lunar landing plan (...I say this because the very point of the Shuttle at its inception was to act as a support vehicle for just such a project as this).
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I think that your idea regarding safety and what the US / NASA is willing to put up with is a little off, with all due respect.
I think the US is perhaps not willing to put up with the
lack of safety that has been profoundly demonstrated by the Shuttle. I do not think it's a matter of not being willing to put up with the risks they did in the 1960s. We put up with "managed risks" in the 1960s. Research pilots did the flying of these spacecraft, and contrary to the popular image of the test pilot, these people were not willing to put up with any undue risk. They didn't just strap in, cast their fate to the winds, and ride off, blindly risking their personal safety and their lives for the thrill of it.
While it's absolutely true that any project which pushes the envelope contains risk, engineers and test pilots strive for safety before anything else. They are aware that things can certainly go wrong in such a program, and that things sometimes do go south in a hurry, but the emphasis is on understanding and envisioning the possibilities of such things, creating procedures and work around for these possibilities, and maintaining a high degree of redundancy so that the risks are what we call "managed".
We could live with
managed risk. In Apollo, I guarantee you that flight crew safety was #1 in priority. The flight crews were intimately involved in every decision pertaining to flight, and the commander of a mission had final word on a GO/NO GO situation.
With the Shuttle, a paradigm shift developed wherein "success" was placed in a priortity over safety. What was done with the shuttle was to
create and ignore risk, risk that didn't need to exist at all, in a program that should've been relatively low risk relative to the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs, which consisted of a series of missions...each of which pushed into new unknown areas of experience. The shuttle pressed no envelope of unknown flight when it completed it's test series (STS-1 through STS-4).
NOTE: Please do not interpret this to mean that I think that Shuttle flights should be utterly safe and risk free. After all, there is risk in jumping on an airplane and flying off to grandma's for the holidays. Granted, it's pretty low (alot lower than jumping in your car and driving there!). To expect that nothing will ever happen, even in what should be relatively routine Earth orbital space operations would be naive. However, we should never have seen what we saw with the disasters of Challenger and Columbia. Those things were the results of risks that were created by the paradigm, and which were ignored.But "success", which was never really defined for the Shuttle (being that it really had no mission or mandate), became the illusory emphasis, and the obvious was ignored by this paradigm shift of NASA management.
To wit, the known SRM field joint problems that were present during the mid 1980s were essentially pushed aside. Data clearly indicated that the O-rings eroded as a function of lowering launch temperatures. No data existed for anything under 50 degrees F, but extrapolating the existing data clearly showed that complete primary and secondary O-ring erosion
could possibly (and perhaps would probably) occur if one launched below a certain temperature...at least by the extrapolation. Conclusive data? No. Enough to cancel? It depends on which NASA you were with.
In 1986, apparently not. In 1969, absolutely. A scrub would've resulted and the problem would've been studied in depth with alot of testing and data gathering. The launch would've been scrubbed until the temperatures for launch were within the known data range.
So, what we had were these two opposed paradigms:
1) 1969.
Is there anything that says we
might have a problem here...anything we see that
might spell a problem? Answer: Yes, this particular condition we haven't seen before. We don't have any data telling us how we'll behave in this realm. We might be fine, but all
our data says that if we go into this realm, we might also have a serious problem.
Result: OK, we scrub until we understand this better.
2) 1986
Same question.
Result: Well, since
we have no proof were going to have a problem, we'll go.
In other words, the one says,
"Prove to me we're safe to the best of our understanding, and we go."
The other says,
"Prove to me were not safe, or else we go."
It's a subtle, but profound difference in thinking. And
that is what people are not willing to put up with anymore.
It's not the risk...it's the lack of managing it that people are unwilling to endure any more.
Regards.