In December 1989 Dean Radin of Princeton's Psychology Department and Roger Nelson of the PEAR lab published a paper on the meta-analysis of micro-PK experiments not, as might be expected, in a parapsychology journal but in the respected physics journal Foundations of Physics. Their paper was entitled, 'Evidence for consciousness-related anomalies in random physical systems.' In their analysis, Radin and Nelson tracked down 152 reports describing 597 experimental studies and 235 control studies by 68 different investigators involving the influence of consciousness on microelectronic systems.

Radin and Nelson's studies showed that the aggregate of all these trials dramatically provided powerful evidence for micro-PK. For they found that the odds against the overall result being the result of chance was 1 in 10 to the power of 35.

To understand how unlikely it is that this result was obtained by chance, it is like finding a lottery ticket in the street, finding that it is the winning ticket and you have won first prize of millions -- and then continuing to find the winning lottery in the street every week for a thousand years.

That such findings continue to be dismissed shows more clearly than anything could that the "skeptics" are not evaluating the data with extra care -- they are in denial.

According to Webster's Dictionary, in law prima facie evidence is "evidence having such a degree of probability that it must prevail unless the contrary be proved." There are a few examples of applied, non-laboratory remote viewings provided to the review team that would seem to meet that criterion for evidence. These are examples in which the sponsor or another government client asked for a single remote viewing of a site, known to the requestor in real time or in the future, and the viewer provided details far beyond what could be taken as a reasonable guess. Two such examples are given by May (1995) in which it appears that the results were so striking that they far exceed the phenomenon as observed in the laboratory. Using a post hoc analysis, Dr. May concluded that in one of the cases the remote viewer was able to describe a microwave generator with 80 percent accuracy, and that of what he said almost 70 percent of it was reliable. Laboratory remote viewings rarely show that level of correspondence.

7/31/00 Page 1

Evidence for Consciousness-Related Anomalies in Random Physical Systems

(from Foundations of Physics (1989) 19, 1499-1514)

Dean I. Radin 1 and Roger D. Nelson 2
Princeton University


Speculations about the role of consciousness in physical systems are frequently
observed in the literature concerned with the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
While only three experimental investigations can be found on this topic in physics
journals, more than 800 relevant experiments have been reported in the literature
of parapsychology. A well-defined body of empirical evidence from this domain
was reviewed using meta-analytic techniques to assess methodological quality and
overall effect size. Results showed effects conforming to chance expectation in
control conditions and unequivocal non-chance effects in experimental conditions.
This quantitative literature review agrees with the findings of two earlier reviews,
suggesting the existence of some form of consciousness–related anomaly in
random physical systems.

1. INTRODUCTION
The nature of the relationship between human consciousness and the physical world has
intrigued philosophers for millenia. In this century, speculations about mind/body interactions persist, often contributed by physicists in discussions of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Virtually all of the founders of quantum theory — Planck, de Broglie, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Einstein — considered this subject in depth (1), and contemporary physicists continue this tradition (2,3,4,5,6,7). The following expression of the problem can be found in a recent interpretation of quantum theory: If conscious choice can decide what particular observation I measure, and therefore into what states my consciousness splits, might not conscious choice also be able to influence the outcome of the measurement? One possible place where mind may influence matter is in quantum effects. Experiments on whether it is possible to affect the decay rates of nuclei by thinking suitable thoughts would presumably be easy to perform, and might be worth doing.(8) 1 Department of Psychology, Princeton University. Present address: Contel Technology
Center, 15000 Conference Center Drive, P.O. Box 10814, Chantilly, VA 22021-3808
2 Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton,
New Jersey 08544


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Given the distinguished history of speculations about the role of consciousness in quantum
mechanics, one might expect that the physics literature would contain a sizable body of empirical data on this topic. A search, however, reveals only three studies. The first is in an article by Hall, Kim, McElroy and Shimony, who reported an experiment “based upon taking seriously the proposal that the reduction of the wave packet is due to a mind-body interaction, in which both of the interacting systems are changed.” (9) This experiment examined whether one person could detect if another person had previously observed a quantum mechanical event (gamma emission from sodium-22 atoms). The idea was based on the supposition that if person A's observation actually changes the physical state of a system, then when person B observes the same system later, B's experience may be different according to whether A has or has not looked at the system. Hall et al's results, based on a total of 554 trials, did not support the hypothesis; the observed number of “hits” obtained in their experiment was precisely the number expected by chance (277), while the variance of their measurements was significantly smaller than expected (p < .05). (9)

The second study is referred to by Hall et al, who end their article by pointing out that a
similar, unpublished experiment using cobalt-57 as the source was successful (40 hits out of 67 trials). (10) The third study is a more systematic investigation reported by Jahn and Dunne (11), who summarize results of over 25 million binary trials collected during seven years of experimentation with random event generators. These experiments, involving long-term data collection with 33 unselected individuals, provide persuasive, replicable evidence of an anomalous correlation between conscious intention and the output of random number generators.

Thus, of three pertinent experiments referenced in mainstream physics journals, one
describes results statistically too close to chance expectation and two describe positive effects. (9-11) Given the theoretical implications of such an effect, it is remarkable that no further experiments of this type can be found in the physics literature; but this is not to say that no such experiments have been performed. In fact, dozens of researchers have reported conceptually identical experiments in the puzzling and uncertain domain of parapsychology. Perhaps because of the insular nature of scientific discipines, the vast majority of these experiments are unknown to most scientists. A few critics who have considered this literature have dismissed the experiments as being flawed, non-replicable, or open to fraud (12,13,14,15,16), but their assertions are countered by at least two detailed reviews which provide strong statistical support for the existence of anomalous consciousness-related effects with random number generators. (17,18) In this paper, we describe the results of a comprehensive, quantitative metaanalysis which focused on the questions of methodological quality and replicability in these experiments.


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2. THE EXPERIMENTS
The experiments reviewed involved some form of microelectronic random number
generator (RNG), a human observer, and a set of instructions for the observer to attempt to “influence” the RNG to generate particular numbers, or changes in a distribution, solely by intention. RNGs are usually based upon a source of truly random events such as electronic noise, radioactive decay, or randomly seeded pseudorandom sequences. (19) Feedback about the distribution of random events is often provided in the form of a digital display, but audio feedback, computer graphics, and a variety of other mechanisms have also been used. Some of the RNGs described in the literature are technically sophisticated, the best devices employing electromagnetic shielding, environmental failsafe mechanisms triggered by deviant voltages, currents, or temperature, automatic computer-based data recording on magnetic media, redundant hard copy output, periodic randomness calibrations, and so on. (18, 20) RNGs are typically designed to produce a sequence of random bits at the press of a button. After generating a sequence of say, 100 random bits (0’s or 1’s), the number of 1’s in the sequence may be provided as feedback. In an experimental protocol using a binary RNG, a run might consist of an observer being asked to cause the RNG to produce, in three successive button presses, a high number (sum of 1's greater than chance expectation of 50), a low number (less than 50), and a control condition with no directional intention. An experiment might consist of a group of individuals each contributing a hundred such runs, or one individual contributing several thousand runs. Results are usually analyzed by comparing high aim and low aim means against a control mean or theoretical chance expectation.

3. META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES
The quantitative literature review, also called meta-analysis, has become a valuable tool in
the behavioral and social sciences. (21) Meta-analysis is analogous to well-established
procedures used in the physical sciences to determine parameters and constants. The technique assesses replication of an effect within a body of studies by examining the distribution of effect sizes. (22,23,24) In the present context, the null hypothesis (no mental influence on the RNG output) specifies an expected mean effect size of zero. A homogeneous distribution of effect sizes with non-zero mean indicates replication of an effect, and the size of the deviation of the mean from its expected value estimates the magnitude of the effect. Meta-analyses assume that effects being compared are similar across different experiments, that is, that all studies seek to estimate the same population parameters. Thus the scope of a quantitative review must be strictly delimited to ensure appropriate commonality across the different studies that are combined. (21, 25) This can present a non-trivial problem


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in meta-analytic reviews because replication studies typically investigate a number of variables in addition to those studied in the original experiments. In the present case, because different subjects, experimental protocols, and RNGs were employed within the reviewed literature, some heterogeneity attributable to these factors was expected in the obtained distribution of effect sizes. However, the circumscription for the review required that every study in the database have the same primary goal or hypothesis, and hence estimate the same underlying effect. Experiments selected for review examined the following hypothesis: The statistical output of an electronic RNG is correlated with observer intention in accordance with pre-specified instructions, as indicated by the directional shift of distribution parameters (usually the mean) from expected values. ecausethis “directional shift” is most often reported as a standard normal deviate (i.e., Z score) in the reviewed experiments, we determined effect size as a Z score normalized by the square root of the sample size (N), e = Z/ N , where N was the total number of individual random events (with probability of a hit at p = 0.5, p = 0.25, etc.). This effect size measure is equivalent to a Pearson product moment correlation. (21)

3.1 Unit of Analysis
To avoid redundant inclusion of data in a meta-analysis, “units of analysis” are often
specified. We employed the following method: If an author distinguished among several
experiments reported in a single article with titles such as “pilot test” or “confirmatory test,” or provided independent statistical summaries, each of these studies was coded and quality-assessed separately. If an experiment consisted of two or more conditions comparing different intentions or types of RNG devices, the data were split into separate units of analysis to allow the results to be coded unambiguously. In general, within a given reviewed report, the largest possible aggregation of non-overlapping data collected under a single intentional aim was defined as the unit of analysis (hereafter called an experiment or study). For each experiment, a Z score was assigned corresponding to whether the observed result matched the direction of intention. Thus, a negative Z obtained under intention to “aim low” was recorded as a positive score. When sufficient data were provided in a report, Z was calculated from those data and compared with the reported results; the new calculation was used if there was a discrepancy. If only probability levels were reported, these were transformed into the corresponding Z score. For experiments reported only as “non-significant,” a conservative value of Z = 0 was assigned; if the outcome was reported only as “statistically significant,” Z = 1.645 was assigned; and if sample size was not reported or could not be calculated from the information provided, a special code of N = 1 was assigned.


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3.2 Assessing Quality
Because the hypothesized anomalous effect is not easily accommodated within the
prevailing scientific world-view, it is particularly important to assess the trustworthiness of each reviewed experiment. Unfortunately, estimating experimental quality tends to be a subjective task confounded by prior expectations and beliefs. (26,27) Estimates of inter-judge reliability in assessing the quality of research reports, for example, rarely exceed correlations of 0.5. (28) We addressed this problem by assigning to each experiment a single quality weight derived from a set of sixteen binary (present/absent) criteria. The first author coded and double-checked the coding for all studies; the second author independently coded the first 100 studies. Inter-judge reliability for quality criteria was r = .802 with 98 degrees of freedom. These criteria were developed from published criticisms about random number generator experiments (14,15,29,30,31,32,33) and from expert opinion on important methodological consider ations when performing studies involving human behavior. (20,34,35) Collectively, these criteria form a measure of credibility by which to judge the reported data. The criteria asssess the integrity of the experiment in four categories – procedures, statistics, the data, and the RNG device – and they cover virtually all methodological criticisms raised to date. They are (1) control tests noted, (2) local controls conducted, (3) global controls conducted, (4) controls established through the experimental protocol, (5) randomness calibrations conducted, (6) failsafe equipment employed, (7) data automatically recorded, (8) redundant data recording employed, (9) data double checked, (10) data permanently archived, (11) targets alternated on successive trials, (12) data selection prevented by protocol or equipment, (13) fixed run lengths specified, (14) formal experiment declared, (15) tamper resistant RNG employed, and (16) use of unselected subjects. Each criterion was coded as being present or absent in the report of an experiment, specifically excluding consideration of previously published descriptions of RNG devices or control tests. This strategy was employed to reflect lower confidence in such experiments since, for example, randomness tests conducted once on an RNG do not guarantee acceptable performance in the same RNG in all future experiments. As a result, assessed quality was conservative, that is, lower than the “true” quality for some experiments, especially those reported only as abstracts or conference proceedings. Using unit weights (which have been shown to be robust in such applications (36)) on each of the sixteen descriptors, the quality rating for an individual experiment was simply the sum of the descriptors. Thus, while a quality score near zero indicated a low quality or poorly reported experiment, a score near sixteen reflected a highly credible experiment.


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3.3 Assessing Effect Size
Assume that each of K experiments produces effect size estimates e of a parameter E, based on N samples, and that each e has a known standard error s. The weighted mean effect size is calculated as e. = _ wi ei / _ wi, where wi = 1/si2 = Ni, and i ranges from 1 to K. The standard error of e. is s =(_wi)-1/2. A test for homogeneity for the K estimates of ei is given eby HK = _ wi (ei-e.)2, where HK has a chi-square distribution with K-1 degrees of freedom. (37) The same procedure can be followed to test for homogeneity of effect size across M independent investigators. In this case, e.j and sej are calculated per investigator, and the test for homogeneity is performed as HM = _wj(e.j-e.M)2, where e.j and wj are mean weighted effect size and 1/s 2 per investigator, respectively, e.M=_wje.j / _wj, and j ranges from 1 to M. eHM has M-1 degrees of freedom. For a quality-weighted analysis, we may determine e.Q = _(Qiwiei) / _(Qiwi), where Qi is the quality assessed for experiment i. The standard error associated with eQ is seQ= (_(Qi2wi)/ (_Qiwi)2)-1/2; the test for homogeneity is similar to that described above. Finally, following the practice of reviewers in the physical sciences (23,24), we deleted potential “outlier” studies to obtain a homogeneous distribution of effect sizes and to reduce the possibility that the calculated mean effect size may have been spuriously enlarged by extreme values. The procedure used was as follows: If the homogeneity statistic for all studies was significant (at the p < .05 level), the study that would produce the largest reduction in this statistic was deleted; this wasrepeated until the homogeneity statistic had become nonsignificant.

4. RESULTS
On-line bibliographic databases for psychology and physics journals were searched, as
was a specialized database covering parapsychological articles, technical reports, conference proceedings and manuscripts. Altogether 152 references were found from 1959 to 1987. These reports described 832 studies conducted by 68 different investigators (597 experimental studies and 235 control studies). Fifty-four experimental and 33 control studies reported only as non-significant were assigned Z = 0. Six experiments and two control studies coded as (N = 1, Z > 0) were eliminated from further meta-analysis because effect size could not be accurately estimated (this required the elimination of one investigator who reported a single study). Figures 1 and 2 show the distributions of Z scores reported for control and experimental studies, respectively.

--- insert Figures 1 and 2 about here --



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These results, expressed as overall mean effect sizes, show that control studies conform
well to chance expectation (Fig. 3a), and that experimental effects, whether calculated for
studies or investigators, deviate significantly from chance expectation (Fig. 3b, 3c). To obtain a homogeneous distribution of effect sizes, it was necessary to delete 17% of individual outlier studies (Fig. 3d) and 13% of mean effect sizes across investigators (Fig. 3e). This may be compared with exemplary physical and social science reviews, where it is sometimes necessary to discard as many as 45% of the studies to achieve a homogeneous effect size distribution. (19) Of individual studies deleted, 77% deviated from the overall mean in the positive direction, and of investigator means deleted, all were positive (i.e., supportive of the experimental hypothesis).

--- insert Figure 3 about here --


4.1 Effect of Quality
Some critics have postulated that as experimental quality increases in these studies, effect
size would decrease, ultimately regressing to the “true” value of zero, i.e., chance results.
(12,13,15,32,33,38) We tested this conjecture with two linear regressions of mean effect size vs. mean quality assessed per investigator, one weighted with wj as defined above and the other weighted with the number of studies per investigator. The calculated slope for the former is -2.5 x 10-5 ± 3.2 x 10-5, and for the latter, -7.6 x 10-4 ± 3.9 x 10-4. These non-significant relationships between quality and effect size is typical of meta-analytic findings in other fields (39,40), suggesting that the present database is not compromised by poor experimental methodology. Another assessment of the effect of quality was obtained by comparing unweighted and quality-weighted effect sizes per experiment (Fig. 3b vs. 3f). These are nearly identical, and the same is true after deleting outliers to obtain a homogeneous quality-weighted distribution (Fig. 3d vs. 3g), confirming that differences in methodological quality are not significant predictors of effect
size. It might be argued that the quality assessment procedure employed here was non-optimal because some quality criteria are more important than others, so that if appropriate weights were assigned, the quality-weighted effect size might turn out to be quite different. This was tested by Monte Carlo simulation, using sets of 16 weights, one per criterion, randomly selected over the range 0 to 6. A quality-weighted effect size was calculated for the 597 experiments as before, now using the random weights instead of unit weights, and this process was repeated one thousand times, yielding a distribution of possible quality ratings. The average effect size from the simulation was 3.18 x 10-4 ± 0.15 x 10-4, indicating that in this particular database coded by these sixteen criteria, the probable range of the quality-weighted mean effect size clearly excludes chance expectation of zero.


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4.2 The “Filedrawer” Problem
Although accounting for differences in assessed quality does not nullify the effect, it is well
known in the behavioral and social sciences that non-significant studies are published less often than significant studies (this is called the “filedrawer” problem (21,41,42,43)). If the number of non-significant studies in the filedrawer is large, this reporting bias may seriously inflate the effect size estimated in a meta-analysis. We explored several procedures for estimating the magnitude of this problem and to assess the possibility that the filedrawer problem can sufficiently explain the observed results. The filedrawer hypothesis implicitly maintains that all or nearly all significant positive results are reported. If positive studies are not balanced by reports of studies having chance and negative outcomes, the empirical Z score distribution should show more than the expected proportion of scores in the positive tail beyond Z = 1.645. While no argument can be made that all negative effects are reported, it is interesting to note that the database contains 37 Z scores in the negative tail, where only 30 would be expected by chance. On the other hand, there are 152 scores in the positive tail, about five times as many as expected. The question is whether this excess represents a genuine deviation from the null hypothesis or a defect in reporting or editorial practices. This question may be addressed by modeling based on the assumption that all significant positive results are reported. A four-parameter fit minimizing the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic was applied to all observed data with Z _ 1.645, using the exponential ö÷ ø | x-m | 2sto simulate the effect of skew or kurtosis in producing the disproportionately long positive tail. This exponential is a probability distribution with the same mean and variance as the normal distribution, but with kurtosis = 3.0. To begin, the null hypothesis of a (0,1) normal distribution with no kurtosis was
considered. To account for the excess in the positive tail, N = 585,000 filedrawer studies were required, and the chi-squared statistic remained far too large to indicate a reasonable fit (see Table 1). This large N, in comparison with the 597 studies actually reported together with the poor goodness-of-fit statistic, suggests that the assumption of a (0,1) normal distribution is inappropriate. Adding simulated kurtosis to a (0,1) normal distribution by mixing exponential (equation (1)) and normal distributions in a 1:1 ratio reduced N by two orders of magnitude, and ratios of 1 –2 Y = e æç L s


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2:1, 3:1 and 10:1 exponential to normal (E:N) yielded further small improvements. However, the chi-squared statistic still indicated a poor fit to the empirical data. Applying the same mixture of exponential and normal distributions, but starting from the observed values of N = 597, mean Z score = .645, and standard deviation = 1.601, with the constraint that the mean could only decrease from .645, resulted in much better fits to the data. Table 1 shows these results. TABLE 1. Four-parameter fit (E:N, N, mean, sd) minimizing chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic (10 df) to the positive tail of the observed Z score distribution, for several exponential:normal ratios. The null hypothesis is tested by
clamping the mean at 0 and the standard deviation at 1, allowing N and E:N to
vary. The empirical database is addressed by allowing all four parameters to
vary. Assumption E:N ratio N mean sd chi-square p Normal 0 585,000 0 1 57,867.84 0
Distribution 1 5,300 0 1 220.97 0 (null hypothesis)
2 4,800 0 1 167.84 0

3 4,600 0 1 148.45 0
10 4,400 0 1 119.69 0

Empirical 0 700 .145 2.10 23.94 .008

Distribution 1 747 .345 1.90 16.32 .091
2 757 .445 1.80 14.21 .164
3 777 .445 1.80 12.95 .226

10 807 .445 1.80 11.08 .351

This procedure shows that the null hypothesis is unviable, even after allowing a huge
filedrawer. The chi-square fit vastly improves with the addition of kurtosis, but only becomes a reasonably good fit when mean and standard deviation are allowed to approximate the empirical values. The filedrawer estimate from this model depends on a number of assumptions (e.g., the true distribution is generally normal, but has a disproportionately large positive tail). It suggests a total number of experimental studies on the order of 800, of which three-fourths have been formally reported. A somewhat simpler modeling procedure was applied to the data assuming that all studies with significant Z scores in either the positive or negative tail are reported. The model is based


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on the normal distribution with a standard deviation = 1, and estimates the mean and N required to account for the 152 Z scores in the positive tail and 37 Z scores in the negative tail. This mean-shift model, which ignores the shape of the observed distribution, results in an N = 1,580 and a mean Z score = .34. These modeling efforts suggest that the number of unreported or unretrieved RNG studies falls in the range of 200 to 1,000. A remaining question is, how many filedrawer studies with an average null result would be required to reduce the effect to non-significance (i.e., p < .05)? This “failsafe” quantity is 54,000 — approximately 90 times the number of studies actually reported. Rosenthal suggests that an effect can be considered robust if the failsafe number is more than five times the observed number of studies. (21)

5. DISCUSSION
Repeatable experiments are the keystone of experimental science. In practice,
repeatability depends upon a host of controllable and uncontrollable ingredients, including
factors such as stochastic variation, changes in environmental conditions, difficulties in
communicating tacit knowledge employed by successful experimenters (44), and so on.
Difficulties in achieving systematic replication are therefore ubiquitous, from experimental
psychology (21,45) to particle physics. (23,24) Of course, this is not to say that systematic
replication is impossible in these or other fields, but it may appear to be extraordinarily difficult when experiments are considered individually rather than cumulatively. In the case of the present database, the authors of a recent report issued by the US National Research Council stated that the overall results of the RNG experiments could not be explained by chance (46), but they questioned the quality and replicability of the research. This meta-analysis shows that effects are not a function of experimental quality, and that the replication rate is as good as that found in exemplary experiments in psychology and physics. Besides the issue of replicability, five other objections are often raised about the present experiments. These are (a) the effect is inconsistent with prevailing scientific models, ( the experimental methodology is technically naïve, thus the results are not trustworthy, © the experiments are vulnerable to fraud by subjects or by experimenters, (d) skeptics cannot obtain positive results, and (e) there are no adequate theoretical explanations or predictions for the anomalous effect. These criticisms may be addressed as follows: (a) “Inconsistency with the scientific world-view” is essentially a philosophical argument that carries little weight in the face of repeatable experimental evidence, as suggested by the present and two corroborating meta-analyses. (17,18) Indeed, if the “inconsistency” argument were sufficient to discount anomalous findings,


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we would have ignored much of the motivation leading to the development of quantum
mechanics. ( The “naïve methodology” argument was empirically addressed by the
assessment of methodological quality in the present analysis. No significant relationship between quality and effect size was found. © Fraud postulated as the explanation of the results is untenable as it would have required wide-spread collusion among 68 independent investigators. In any case, even severe critics of parapsychological experiments have discounted fraud as a viable explanation. (32) (d) Skeptics often assert that only “believers” obtain positive results in such experiments. However, a thorough literature search finds not a single attempted replication of the RNG experiment by a publically-proclaimed skeptic, thus the assertion is not based on verifiable evidence. Furthermore, skeptics who claim to have attempted replications insist (without providing details or references) that they have never achieved positive results in any of their RNG experiments. (15,47) Such a claim is itself quite remarkable, as the likelihood of
never obtaining a statistically significant result by chance in series of experiments can be
extremely low, depending on the number of experiments conducted. Unfortunately, because we cannot determine how many experiments skeptics have actually conducted, it is impossible to judge the validity of this criticism.

Finally, (e) the “no theoretical basis” argument is correct, but it does not support a negative conclusion about experimental observation. There are at present no adequate theories, with the possible exception of some interpretations of quantum mechanics (2,3,8,11), that convincingly explain or predict consciousness-related anomalies in random physical systems. We note, however, that the anomalous effects reviewed in this paper apparently can be operationally predicted under well-specified conditions. For example, when individuals are instructed to “aim” for high (or low) numbers in RNG experiments, it is possible to predict with some small degree of confidence that anomalous positive (or negative) shifts of distribution means will be observed.

6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have summarized results of all known experiments testing possible
interactions between consciousness and the statistical behavior of random number generators. The overall effect size obtained in experimental conditions cannot be adequately explained by methodological flaws or selective reporting practices. Therefore, after considering all of the retrievable evidence, published and unpublished, tempered by all legitimate criticisms raised to date, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that under certain circumstances, consciousness interacts with random physical systems. Whether this effect will ultimately be established as an


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overlooked methodological artifact, as a novel bioelectrical perturbation of sensitive electronic devices, or as an empirical contribution to the philosophy of mind, remains to be seen.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was supported by major grants from the James S. McDonnell Foundation, Inc.
and the John E. Fetzer Foundation, Inc. The authors express their gratitude to Dr. York
Dobyns of the Princeton University Engineering Anomalies Laboratory for his assistance with the filedrawer models.

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. R. Rosenthal, Meta-analytic procedures for social research. (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1984); K. Wachter, “Disturbed by meta-analysis?” Science, 241, 1407-1408 (1988). We may note that Cohen’s h, the difference between control and experimental proportions, is a common effect size measure that might have been used in
the present study. This was rejected in favor of e, as defined, because some of the reviewed studies reported only final p-values or only overall Z scores; e was thus deemed more useful in the present meta-analysis.

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Radin & Nelson Page 15

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147.

Page 16

Figure Captions

Fig. 1. Distribution of Z scores reported in 235 control studies. Thirty-three of these studies
were reported only as “non-significant” and were assigned Z scores of zero. To replace
the spurious spike at Z = 0, those 33 studies were recast as normally distributed Z scores,
bounded by ±1.64, averaging Z = 0.

Fig. 2. Distribution of Z scores reported in 597 experimental studies. Fifty-four of these studies were reported as “non-significant” and were assigned Z scores of zero. As in Fig. 1,
those 54 studies were recast as normally distributed Z scores, bounded by ±1.64,
averaging Z = 0.

Fig. 3. Mean effect size point estimates ± 1 standard error for (a) control studies, ( individual experiments, © mean effect size per investigator, (d) homogeneous mean effect size for experiments, (e) homogeneous mean effect size per investigator, (f) mean effect size for quality-weighted experiments, and (g) mean effect size for homogeneous quality-weighted experiments.

Radin and Nelson Figures



Did they bend any spoons in this study...???

To understand how unlikely it is that this result was obtained by chance, it is like finding a lottery ticket in the street, finding that it is the winning ticket and you have won first prize of millions -- and then continuing to find the winning lottery in the street every week for a thousand years.

1) Main Entry: un•like•ly
Function: adjective
Pronunciation: -'lī-kle
1 : not likely : IMPROBABLE
2 : likely to fail : UNPROMISING

Main Entry: tre•men•dous
Function: adjective
Pronunciation: tri-'men-d&s
Etymology: Latin tremendus, from gerundive of tremere
1 : being such as may excite trembling or arouse dread, awe, or terror
2 a : notable by reason of extreme size, power, greatness, or excellence -- often used as a generalized term of approval b : unusually large : HUGE
synonym see MONSTROUS
- tre•men•dous•ly adverb
- tre•men•dous•ness noun

Abstract- This paper discusses evidence for a psychokinetic effect acting on chance events. Emphasis is laid on psychokinetic action on pre-recorded random processes and its interpretation in terms of two general hypotheses, the weak violation hypothesis, and the equivalence hypothesis. These hypotheses imply that psychokinesis can act on the outcome of indeterministic quantum events only, and that, basically, all such events are affected to the same degree.


Conclusion
Quantum theory has raised some still puzzling questions with regard to the role of the observer and the nature of reality. At the same time, the mathematical elegance and the logical consistency of quantum theory has suggested that the theory may have universal validity, being applicable even to systems that include human subjects. And with conventional quantum theory apparently experimentally correct, there seemed little demand for modifications with their inherent mathematical complications.

The results of parapsychology, on the other hand, indicate that quantum theory can be experimentally wrong when applied to systems that include a human subject. Experiments like the reported ones, point to specific links between the quantum formalism and psychic effects, suggesting a wealth of further interesting experiments. It remains to be seen whether the results will lead to a new quantum theory that includes psychic effects within its mathematical formalism, or whether they will merely outline some final limitation of the quantum formalism.

Rest of link.....

REPLICATION AND META-ANALYSIS IN PARAPSYCHOLOGY
[This paper was published in "Statistical Science," 1991, Vol. 6, No. 4, 363-403.]

Jessica Utts

ABSTRACT

Parapsychology, the laboratory study of psychic phenomena, has had its history interwoven with that of statistics. Many of the controversies in parapsychology have focused on statistical issues, and statistical models have played an integral role in the experimental work. Recently, parapsychologists have been using meta-analysis as a tool for synthesizing large bodies of work. This paper presents an overview of the use of statistics in parapsychology and offers a summary of the meta-analyses that have been conducted. It begins with some anecdotal information about the involvement of statistics and statisticians with the early history of parapsychology. Next, it is argued that most nonstatisticians do not appreciate the connection between power and "successful" replication of experimental effects. Returning to parapsychology, a particular experimental regime is examined by summarizing an extended debate over the interpretation of the results. A new set of experiements designed to resolve the debate is then reviewed. Finally, meta-analyses from several areas of parapsychology are summarized. It is concluded that the overall evidence indicates that there is an anomalous effect in need of an explanation.

So what happens when we examine the evidence for psi phenomena? Certain categories of psi experiments have been extensively conducted at independent institutions by seperate research teams. These psi phenomena have all been subject to meta-analysis by Dean Radin and other independent meta-analysists, including skeptics such as Ray Hyman. And the effects are astronomically significant. For certain types of experiment such as the Ganzfeld and auto-ganzfeld, the time, effort and expense means that most of the data which could have been collected has been included in these meta-analyses, so no possible "file drawer" effects can even exist.

Below I have reproduced Radin's charts for meta-analysis of dream telepathy experiments, the 1985 Ganzfeld meta-analysis by Hyman and Honorton, an updated Ganzfeld meta-analysis, high-security ESP card tests, RNG PK experiments and dice-rolling PK experiments. Although all of these meta-analyses include data from trials showing non-significant effects, the overall meta-analysis is clear. These phenomena all show enormous, often astronomical deviations from the null hypothesis.

So the answer is clear. Certain psi phenomena have gone up against the most rigorous examination possible and come out with the scientific seal of approval. So why do so many scientists and "rationalists" think that psi is "nonsense", "without a shred of real evidence"? I'm afraid that is more of a sociological question than a scientific one.

Evidence for Quantum Brain Fluctuations
Sent from:
sarfatti@netcom.com
(Jack Sarfatti)
Subj: EPR Correlations #1 Date: 94-06-11 04:46:53 EDT From: DougieG

Here's an interesting bit of scientific research:


Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Correlations in the Brain-Mind: the Transferred Potential
{Taken from "Science Within Consciousness: Developing a Science Based on the Primacy of Consciousness," by Amit Goswami, PhD. An Institute of Noetic Sciences Research Report. Copyright 1994 by Amit Goswami. Posted with permission, see published report for full bibliographic references and [4] for EEG recordings of evoked and transferred potentials}
In 1935, three physicists, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen criticized quantum mechanics claiming that if it were a complete model of reality, then nonlocal interactions between objects had to exist. [1] Since that was deemed inconsistent with the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics had to be either wrong or at least incomplete. This critique is known as the Einstein-Podolosky-Rosen (EPR) paradox.

Bell [2] prepared the theoretical groundwork for experimental tests of EPR nonlocality and Aspect et al. [3] experimentally verified that a nonlocal correlation between objects indeed occurs once these objects have interacted.

There is now evidence that EPR correlation occurs between human brains. For the rest of this section, we will follow the development given in [4].

The latest in quantum computing is demonstration of the GHZ Theorem (a totally “back to the future” type of information theory that does not use statistics). This demonstration enables a superliminal deterministic exchange of information—in otherwords telepathy! To quote from the article described in the below abstract: ”...the contradiction between QM and local realistic theories arises even for definite predictions…. manifest in a single run….”

In otherwords up till now the standard interpretation of Bell’s Theorem is that it can only be solved “after the fact” even though it’s instanteous because it uses random statistics. This method uses THREE qbits instead of two and by using three as “hyperentanglement” and by using non-statistical information theory then telepathy and telekinesis (teleportation) is now a reality.

The second abstract entitled “quantum pseudo-telepathy” states the following important realization: Thanks to entanglement, perhaps the most nonclassical manifestation of quantum mechanics, two or more quantum players can accomplish a distributed task with no need for communication whatsoever, which would be an impossible feat for classical players.

Quantum Pseudo-Telepathy
Authors: Brassard, Gilles; Broadbent, Anne; Tapp, Alain
Quantum information processing is at the crossroads of physics, mathematics and computer science. It is concerned with that we can and cannot do with quantum information that goes beyond the abilities of classical information processing devices. Communication complexity is an area of classical computer science that aims at quantifying the amount of communication necessary to solve distributed computational problems. Quantum communication complexity uses quantum mechanics to reduce the amount of communication that would be classically required. Pseudo-telepathy is a surprising application of quantum information processing to communication complexity. Thanks to entanglement, perhaps the most nonclassical manifestation of quantum mechanics, two or more quantum players can accomplish a distributed task with no need for communication whatsoever, which would be an impossible feat for classical players. After a detailed overview of the principle and purpose of pseudo-telepathy, we present a survey of recent and no-so-recent work on the subject. In particular, we describe and analyse all the pseudo-telepathy games currently known to the authors.

Xavier takes Alice far away from Bob and Yolande. At predetermined times, Xavier and Yolande name animals from their lists to Alice and Bob. For example, Xavier and Yolande simultaneously say “lion” and “giraffe”, respectively. Without consulting each other, Alice and Bob must immediately decide whether or not they werepresented with the same animal;in this case, they should both answer “no!”. If Alice and Bob succeed systematically in a sufficiently long sequence of trials, Xavier and Yolande will conclude that Alice and Bob are able to communicate somehow. But if communication is classically impossible because Alice and Bob are sufficiently far apart that a signal from Alice going at the speed of light would not reach Bob in time to influence his answer (and vice versa from Bob to Alice), then Xavier and Yolande would be forced into believing that Alice and Bob are able to
communicate in a way unknown to (classical) physics. In this case,telepathy would not
seem to be worse than any other esoteric “explanation”, would it?

It turns out that quantum mechanics cannot help Alice and Bob win this animal guessing game. (Otherwise, a solution to this game could be harnessed to provide faster than-light signalling.) But there are other similar games that are equally impossible for classical players, yet they can be won systematically, without any communication, provided
Alice and Bob share prior entanglement. This is the phenomenon we call “pseudo-telepathy”because it would appear as magical as “true” telepathy to a classical
physicist, yet it has a perfectly scientific explanation: quantum mechanics.

Scientists Find Evidence Of Paranormal Powers

By Anil Dawar
The Daily Telegraph
7-3-4

If you have ever felt that someone is watching you, sending prickles up your neck, it might not have been just your imagination.

Scientists have found evidence to suggest we do have a sixth sense and can tell when we are being watched, even through CCTV.

This shows humans could have paranormal powers, say researchers at Germany's Freiberg University.

Dr Stefan Schmidt and his team carried out two experiments a thousand times and believe they have finally proved the reality of the sixth sense.

The first, called "remote staring'', consisted of a volunteer in a sealed room watching a second volunteer in another room via CCTV.

The second volunteer was hooked up to electrodes which recorded the ``prickle'' or electrical activity of the skin. This was compared when the volunteer was or was not being watched.

In the second experiment, called ``direct mental interaction'', the first volunteer concentrated on making the second feel uncomfortable or relaxed from within the sealed cell.

The German team used a complex statistical scale to grade the studies according to reliability and paranormal effect recorded.

In other experiments, the starer tried to make the other feel either uncomfortable or relaxed. Again, the electronic monitor proved repeatedly that it could be done.

In the British Journal of Psychology, Dr Schmidt noted that the data was ambiguous but found that "for both data sets there is a small but significant effect''.

While the findings will please believers in the paranormal, they are not enough to convince the sceptics.

Psychology professor Richard Wiseman, of Hertfordshire University, said: "The number of times you turn around and find someone not looking at you far outnumber the times when you do but you only remember the times you turned round to see someone looking.''

Back in the 1960s Czech psychologist Milan Ryzl did a series of experiments with two supposedly telepathic people who were many kilometres apart.

The ``sender'' was asked to try to make the ``receiver'' feel uncomfortable by imagining that he had been buried alive, and succeeded in inducing a crippling attack of asthma.

Mr Ryzl was inspired by a colleague, Stepan Figar, who had proved that when one person concentrates on another, it can actually cause a measurable rise in blood pressure.

Tapping the paranormal * The 'sixth sense' - knowing something without seeing or hearing it. * Dr Stefan Schmidt did more than 1000 experiments, involving two people in different rooms. * One of them would observe the other over a CCTV monitor. * Electrodes were attached to the skin of the volunteer being watched. * A meter registered 'prickling' in the skin if he was being stared at.

Copyright 2004 News Limited.