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Issue and Interchange
Issue: Is Non-Christian Thought Justifiable?

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The goal of this regular feature is to provide our readers with opposing arguments on topics pertinent to the Christian life. We hope to encourage the reader to focus on the arguments involved in each position rather than on personal factors. The authors selected for the respective sides in the debate are outspoken supporters of their viewpoints.
Douglas Jones opens the interchange by sketching the argument for the Christian critique of non-Christian thought. Douglas Jones, an elder in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, is the editor of Antithesis and a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Idaho and Lewis-Clark State College.

Keith Parsons offers the first of two atheistic responses to Jones's essay. Keith Parsons, Ph.D., (Queen's University, Ontario, Canada) is the founder of Georgia Skeptics and teaches philosophy at Berry College (Rome, Georgia). He is the author of God and the Burden of Proof (Prometheus), and Science, Confirmation, and the Theistic Hypothesis (Peter Lang).

Michael Martin presents the second atheistic critique of Jones's essay. Michael Martin is Professor of Philosphy, Boston University, Ph.D. (Harvard University), author of The Case Against Christianity (Temple University Press, 1991) and Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Temple University Press, 1990).

To close out the interchange, Jones resonds to the essays of Parsons and Martin.


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Jones: The Futility of Non Christian Thought
Biblical Christianity, properly defined in terms of classical Protestantism, offers a radical philosophical critique of non-Christian thought. This Christian critique is radical in the sense that it challenges the very core of non-Christian pretensions and demonstrates that non-Christian thought, whether atheistic, agnostic, or religious, ultimately destroys rationality, science, ethics, and every other aspect of human experience.
Moreover, since a properly Biblical critique ought to attack the heart of non-Christian thinking, it may not assume the very standards it demonstrates as futile (a lá Aquinas, Swinburne, etc.) or capitulate to relativism or fideism (a lá Plantinga; Kierkegaard, etc.) or subserviently argue that the Christian worldview is merely "probable" (a lá Clark, Montgomery, Geisler, Moreland, etc.). A properly Biblical critique will not only demonstrate the utter futility of non-Christian thought, it will positively demonstrate that the Christian view of reality is intellectually inescapable. As Cornelius Van Til has argued, "Christianity can be shown to be, not `just as good as' or even `better than' the non-Christian position, but the only position that does not make nonsense of human experience."

I will begin with a brief elaboration of a Christian critique of non-Christian thought and then turn to summarize the positive argument for the Christian view of reality. Though I focus on "secular" non-Christian outlooks in the history of philosophy, the same types of problems arise in "religious" non-Christian outlooks (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.), but that discussion is the topic of a different essay.

Sketch of the Christian Critique of Non-Christian Thought
The Apostle Paul famously challenged: "Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?" (I Cor. 1:20). The Biblical outlook rejects non-Christian claims to knowledge as "knowledge falsely so-called" (I Tim. 6:20) and "vain deceit" (Col. 2:8), since such claims are allegedly justified autonomously rather than by the standard of God's knowledge (Prov. 1:7; Rom. 1: 18-25; Col. 2:8). In this perspective, then, the chief traits of non-Christian thought are rebellion and its concomitant, epistemological autonomy (self rule).
Epistemological autonomy is the view that the human mind is the final criterion of knowledge. According to this view, common to non-Christian thinkers from Thales to Derrida, the Christian God has to be either non-existent or irrelevant to epistemological concerns. Human categories alone are necessary to determine modality, truth, and value. From a Christian perspective, autonomy is a rebellious attempt to deify human categories or some aspect of creation by attempting to usurp the Creator's functions -- i.e. replacing the Creator with the creature (Rom. 1:25). Nevertheless, the result of this attempt to be epistemologically independent of the Christian God is epistemological futility.

The basis for the foregoing conclusion may be sketched as follows:

(I) Non-Christian autonomy may exemplify itself in three primary ways -- epistemological competence, incompetence, or a mixture of competence and incompetence.

(A) Non-Christians thinkers who emphasize the first of these three options are those who maintain that the human mind is competent to interpret, evaluate, and describe reality (e.g., Parmenides, Aristotle, the Rationalists, the Empiricists, etc.).

{B}Non-Christian thinkers who emphasize the second of these three options are those who maintain that the human mind is incompetent to be determinative for reality since humans are finite and reality is characterized by chance eventuation (e.g., the Sophists, various subjectivist traditions, Nietzche, the Existentialists, the later Wittgenstein, Derrida).

© Finally, non-Christian thinkers who consciously aim to synthesize the first two options are those who admit that the human mind is partly competent and partly incompetent (e.g., Plato: the realms of Being vs. Becoming; Kant: the realms of the Phenomena vs. the Noumena).

(II) Each of these three non-Christian emphases ultimately destroys knowledge and leaves the non-Christian with radical ignorance about the world, truth, and values.

(A) Those thinkers who maintain that the human mind is competent to serve as its own criterion of truth ultimately encounter their own finitude; their particular rational scheme cannot account for everything since the autonomous theorist does not have God's abilities. Instead of the proposed exhaustive scheme of reality, the non-Christian will either deny or ignore whatever doesn't fit his rational scheme, thus compromising the proposed scheme (e.g., Parmenides' "illusion" of change; Aristotle's unformed matter; the Logical Positivists' "rejection of metaphysics") and radically limit knowledge to trivial and/or unsubstantive claims that will apparently fit within the scheme (e.g., Descartes' "cogito"; the Empiricists' vacuous sense perceptions).

But whatever the particular tack, the presumed autonomous competence finally reduces to epistemological incompetence -- the rational scheme fails leaving subjectivism and skepticism.

{B} Those thinkers who maintain that the human mind is incompetent to serve as its own criterion of truth do not fare any better. Though apparently more humble in their refusal to make the human mind schematize reality, they nonetheless determine to play the autonomous God in their own subjective reality. Nevertheless, they cannot defend their claim to autonomous incompetence without invoking some of the objective standards of their "opponents," the autonomous competents. In other words, autonomous incompetents must turn to objective, rational schemes in order to defend their opposition to objective knowledge (e.g., Protagoras' defense of "better" views in the midst of a radical relativism; the later Wittgenstein's "proper use" of language; Derrida's use of logocentrism to urge us to abandon logocentrism). Similarly, autonomous incompetents evidence the weakness of their subjectivism by their practical inconsistencies (e.g., Marx's opposition to injustice; Derrida's support for Nelson Mandela).

In a direct reversal of the first non-Christian option, the presumed autonomous incompetence finally reduces to epistemological competence -- subjectivism needs objective schemes. Non-Christian incompetence fails and starts the circle all over again.

© Perhaps the way out of this non-Christian futility is a conscious synthesis of the first two options along the lines of a Plato or Kant. But futility plus futility will not rescue the non-Christian thinker. The same problems raised against the first two options will arise again. For example, Plato's attempt to exhaustively explain reality in terms of a synthesis of Forms (unchanging; immaterial; human competence) with the realm of Becoming (constant change; material; human incompetence) must have, but cannot have, an unchanging Form of change. His whole synthesis collapses.

Similarly, Kant's synthesis of competence and incompetence demands that we can say something rational about the noumenal realm (knowledge of the unknowable) and denies that we can ultimately know the "things-in-themselves" of the phenomenal realm (no-knowledge of the knowable). Autonomous syntheses such as these merely compound the epistemological futilities of non-Christian thought.

Van Til noted that "all the antinomies of antitheistic reasoning are due to a false separation of man from God." Such a separation inevitably leads to the destruction of knowledge. I turn now to briefly examine a particular, contemporary example of non-Christian thought.

Case in Point: Paul Kurtz
Paul Kurtz (The Transcendental Temptation) is well known for his strident philosophical defenses of humanism and atheism, so he is a prime candidate for a Christian critique. If, in general, non-Christian worldviews destroy knowledge, then we should expect to find the same epistemological futility in Kurtz' worldview; he doesn't let us down.
Kurtz' text noted above is replete with examples of how the commitment to autonomous competence gives way to autonomous incompetence and the destruction of knowledge. Consider his comments regarding the knower and the standards of knowledge:

The Knower: On the one hand, we as supposedly autonomous beings have knowledge because "experience and reason are drawn upon in ordinary life and in the sophisticated sciences to establish reliable knowledge" (p. 23); "There is a well-established body of knowledge" (p. 37). Moreover, Kurtz advocates an epistemology of "the act" which rescues us from the "traps of earlier theories of experience" (e.g. the ego-centric predicament) in that the "external world is a precondition for internal awareness" (p. 32). Autonomous, competent knowledge is so reliable that Kurtz can unhesitatingly describe religious opponents as mystics living in "a world of fantasy" and "romantic superstition" (p. xi).

Yet on the other hand, this competent, robust account of knowledge encounters its finite limits and admits its incompetence: "many things in the universe remain beyond our present understanding, transcending the present boundaries of knowledge" (p. 316). In fact, human knowledge "is not an absolute picture of reality" (p. 34), nevertheless, the skeptic's more heroic stance is to deny that transcendental "forms of reality are knowable or meaningful" (p. 26).

Obviously Kurtz is embroiled in a vitiating tension. His commitment to the competence of human categories is undermined by their finitude. If autonomous categories are so limited as to leave, now or forever, much of reality "unknowable" then Kurtz cannot speak with any boldness whatsoever about our present knowledge since there might be some factor in this unknown realm which makes our robust claim to knowledge false. Kurtz simply can't justify the claim of epistemological competence. On his own terms, then, we can have no knowledge.

Even if we ignore this tension, how does Kurtz' epistemology of "the act" give us any non-trivial knowledge? Though he claims to get beyond the ego-centric predicament, he doesn't get anywhere important. In generous terms, the most his view provides us with is the bare knowledge that there are external objects. But there are light-years between this trivial claim and a "body of well-established knowledge."

The Standards of Knowledge: Knowledge requires objective standards, and, on the side of epistemological competence, Kurtz speaks of "deductive necessity" (p. 38), "logical consistency" (p. 46), "canons of induction" (p. 55), "the rule of contradiction" (p.28), "simple and beautiful mathematical and causal laws" (p. 292), "the magnificent splendor of nature and the order and regularities we discover in it" (p. 316), and the cosmos appearing "to behave in terms of immutable and universal laws" (p. 288).

Yet with equal vigor, on the side of epistemological incompetence, he must defend the view that "there are no firm and unchanging, absolute binding principles involved in scientific inquiry" (p. 44). "There are failures in nature and there are fluke occurrences.....Chance factors intervene" (p. 291). Moreover, evolution is a "key principle in interpreting the universe" (p. 288) and most notably, "Change is not a human invention, but a cosmic fact, applying to all forms of life" (p. 289).

Such horrendous epistemological conflicts within a non-Christian worldview are common; they are results of epistemological autonomy. First, we can challenge the non-Christian to justify the standards of rationality he appeals to. Kurtz ultimately justifies the standards of inductive and deductive logic as "simply convenient rules of inquiry, vindicated by their consequences" (p. 88). Aside from Kurtz' question-begging appeal to pragmatic "vindication," if the standards of rationality are merely convenient rules, then we need not take anything Kurtz says seriously, including his objections to Christianity.

But even more damaging on this score is the metaphysical conflict between logical laws which are supposedly necessary and unchanging that magically appear in a non-Christian cosmos of "no unchanging principles," where change applies to all of life. Which is it? Whichever path Kurtz follows will lead to the destruction of rationality, science, ethics, etc.

None of the above criticisms and challenges are unique to Paul Kurtz. You will find the same problems in atheists such as Nielsen, Flew, Parsons, Martin, and throughout non-Christian philosophies and religions. Non-Christians need to justify these elementary concerns about their worldview before they attempt to foist their secular myths upon Christians. To reverse a line from Kurtz, "[Christian] skeptics ought to refuse to be lured by the [autonomous] myths of the day."

The Inescapability of Christianity
In brief, Biblical Christianity avoids the futilities of non-Christian philosophies by rejecting epistemological autonomy. In contrast to a futile epistemological competence, the Christian acknowledges that the universe is fully knowable to the Christian God and to us as far as He reveals his knowledge to us. Hence, Christian philosophy does not destroy knowledge by means of the self-vitiating finite criteria or impotent knowledge claims. Moreover, in contrast to a futile epistemological incompetence, the Christian acknowledges that the human mind must look to the objective standard of God and His revelation, thus not falling prey to subjectivistic dilemmas which vex non-Christian thought.
Hence, instead of hopelessly attempting to determine truth by means of finite products of chance, a Christian view of reality acknowledges the Christian God as the inescapable precondition of all thought. Thus we offer a transcendental argument to establish the truth of Christianity: If the Christian view of reality is not true, then knowledge is impossible. Only the Christian view of reality provides the conditions necessary for logic, induction, scientific progress, ethics, history, and the arts. As Van Til says, "Science, philosophy, and theology find their intelligible contact only on the presupposition of the self-revelation of God in Christ." Hence, a consistent Christian philosophy takes most seriously Christ's claim that "without Me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). Though non-Christians will strenuously object to such claims, their objections against Christianity will all the while presuppose the truth of Christianity. (end)


Copyright © by Covenant Community Church of Orange County 1991


edit bold font error

So to boil it down....

Christian thinking is correct because it is based on belief in the bible and God; non-christian thinking is worthless because it ISN'T?



"the wheels on the bus go round and round, round and round..."

Uh... From the source being "The Covenant Community Church of Orange County", then it's pretty obvious that they came to the conclusion that non-christian thinking is void compared to christian thinking. It's rolling in 110% Bias, it's not like a church would say athiest thinking is correct now is it...

Edit; spelling, damn typo demons

So, according to that document, once you have accepted a Christian view of things you've fallen into a metaphorical big hole from which you cant be rescued?


How sad!

I sense a big ego here. As if this gentleman is god's gift to himself.



It is at this very intersection of knowing and not knowing where a person either verges towards faith and proclaims Christian views as the final answer, as opposed to admitting that the answers have not been fullfilled and waits for discovery to dictate the known from the unknown.

The non-christian view does not prove that they will "ultimately encounter their own finitude" because this is not what we have observed throughout history. To allow the door to remain open does not constitute a finitude but the opposite, an infinitude of possibility. The responsible and truthful thing to do is to keep this door, to things not yet known, open......it seems that by way of this author's stance that his christian view entails a fear of saying WE DON'T KNOW YET!!

The author stated in regards to non-christian views "their particular rational scheme cannot account for everything since the autonomous theorist does not have God's abilities.". The key factor here is that a Non-Christian view does not claim to account for everything. Where as the christian view by the author's stance does make this claim by way of faith. The reader of this statement may even feel a sudden inferiority as a result of not having God's abilities. This is to imply that these god like abilities are needed to understand the universe.......almost to say "do not venture forth for you are setting yourself up for failure......only God ventures there".

Is it not a more truthful stance to admit that many questions are in fact not answered yet, as opposed to filling the gaping hole of things not yet understood with the mucilage of Christian faith?

In a propagandist cheerleader of a RAH in support of christian views, the author very slyly states that the non-Christian will either deny or ignore whatever doesn't fit his rational scheme, thus compromising the proposed scheme..... and radically limit knowledge to trivial and/or unsubstantive claims that will apparently fit within the scheme . This claim is almost freudian in nature, where as the accusation of denying facts or evidence is reversed onto the Non-Christian.

The only thing in regards to this essay that the Non-Christian says does not fit his rational scheme is the Christian God, for the Christian God or the belief in as an answer to everything is in fact irrational.

This essay reads more as a desperate fear ridden plea to CEASE all progress and endeaverment into things not understood,by way of implying falsefied perils of Non-Christian views, than it does an objective critique of Non-Christian views.

anything I say at this point... *is still fumeing* will get me banned.

Save that I am *this* close to being so completely jaded against christianity... as in i've had it up to my ears with this "I'm right, you're wrong, stop pursecuting us christians, you're going to hell" bull...

meh, don't let it ruffle your fur SG.

That kind of judgemental attitude gives them comfort. They sit with a smug smile "knowing" they are right.

As long as they harm no others, or are allowed near sharp objects, who are we to intervene?

the extract is extremely biased, a church would not accpet a non-christian thinking to be even remotely correct - seeing as they'd be forced to accept a possibility that their 'god' doesn't exist. And well... as if some religious guy would even think that, just as an atheist thinking that a 'god' may exist - although that'd mean they'd be agnostic which is completely away from the word athiest.

uh... I forgot what I was actually going to say... I'll edit this if I remember...

It never ceases to amaze me people can sit a computer which has its foundations in non-Christian thought such as mathematics, logic, and science, and write such BS.

Just another example of christians placing themselves above the rest of us, really isn't the first time either.

The church wonders why more stray from their flock this is certainly one of the reasons.

Yep.

One of the main reason I no longer consider Christianity as a viable belief for myself is the utte rcontempt it seems to hold for those who are not Christian.

How can a religion that professes no respect for other people expect to be respected in turn. It is ridiculous In my opinion.

Love thy neighbor (Unless he refuses to go to your church.).

Joey, the burden on proof is on the christians IMO, we are saying there is NO bearded dude in the sky who terrorizes and kills for glee, practices genocide and infanticide and hates women and is homobhobic, is sexually repressed and "power' hungry except in the men that came up with this and jsutifiy it by saying a 'god' tells them to do this but can't produce proof, i think the billion dollar tax free money gathered in the name of diety is motivation to keep this lie going.....what do you say Joey??? The faith conjecture will be the gist of the debate...yep the wheels go round and round.... ..... until the last 20 years or so when alot of humans are calling this bluff, they use infringing on their relgious right to hate and discriminate and they use a book of fables , the toothfairy defense, or um because 'god' is god and he can.... um huh... IMO..as its good for a gasp and a the next installment of texas chain saw massacre, but a value system ..Morals.....un uh no you din't *snap * *snap * .

I think any thinking that goes outside the established bounds is a good thing.

It is the only way to advance really. Other wise the wheels just turn in place and noone gets anywhere new.

I still believe that Christianity at its core isn't all that bad...its what is layered on top that isn't so great.

Generalizations, Ignorance, Stereotypes, Bashing, Discrimination, Misinformation, and Fanatics...the seven deadly sins of Spirituality v.s. Skepticism.

Thanks for posting, GW. One would think you're almost becoming Christian by bringing links such as this here

Though am I the only one who has not missed that this is only the introduction to a formal debate, the continuation of which can also be found at the same website, including (obviously) responses from the two prominent non-Christians involved in the debate. The concept of a formal debate is to try and show how your opponent is wrong and you are right. It's making your case in the best possible light to sway the judges. The idea is to smooth over any wrinkles and make it seem as if your view is the only logical response. When you read the response from Keith Parsons (I only read that far, I didn't read Michael Martin's response - not yet, at least), you'll see that his post is just as biased, the same thing is happening there. That's the nature of formal debating.

Come to think of it, here is Parson's response, taken from that website:

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Parsons Responds: Is Non-Christian Thought Futile?

Readers of recent theistic philosophers are likely to be struck by contrast between the sophistication of the logical machinery employed and the modesty of the claimed results. Alvin Plantinga expends vast labors of modal logic to argue that theism is no less rational than atheism. Richard Swinburne devotes his enormous expertise in Bayesian confirmation theory to the claim that God's existence is rather more likely than his non-existence. In such a context, Douglas Jones's claim is truly breathtaking: "...non-Christian thought, whether atheistic, agnostic, or religious, ultimately destroys rationality, science, ethics, and every other aspect of human experience." Further, " A properly Biblical critique [of non-Christian thought] will not only demonstrate the utter futility of non-Christian thought, it will positively demonstrate that the Christian view of reality is intellectually inescapable [emphasis in original]." All this in a little over two pages!

Clearly, Jones is making some very big claims, and very big claims take a lot of proving. Further, philosophical claims are like the proverbial prizefighter: The bigger they are, the harder they fall. Jones's claims fall very hard.

According to Jones, the fatal flaw of non-Christian thought is "epistemological autonomy," which he defines as follows:

Epistemological autonomy is the view that the human mind is the final criterion of knowledge. According to this view, common to non-Christian thinkers from Thales to Derrida, the Christian God has to be either non-existent or irrelevant to epistemological concerns. Human categories alone are necessary to determine modality, truth, and value.

Odd. I thought Thales flourished circa 600 B.C. and so would be most unlikely to have any sort of opinion about the Christian God. Anachronisms aside, there are a number of puzzling things about this remarkable passage. For one thing, what are we to make of the charge that non-Christians regard the human mind as the "final criterion for knowledge"? We have to know what Jones means by this last phrase before we can understand his accusation.

Perhaps, and this seems the most reasonable construal of Jones's meaning, he is accusing non-Christians of recognizing no higher authority for their judgements about truth, value, etc., than what their own minds tell them is true, valuable, and so forth. As a non-Christian, I hasten to plead guilty to this accusation.

All I want to know is, what is the alternative? Should I believe that something is true or valuable that my mind tells me is not? Should I suspend my own judgements about truth and defer to some alleged revelation? How, then do I know that it is a true revelation? Jones cannot say, on pain of appealing to the very criterion he rejects, that I could trust my own mind to tell me that it is a true revelation. Could another revelation tell me that the first revelation is true? But how, then, would I know that that revelation is true? Surely we are on the road to an infinite regress.

The upshot is that nobody, not even Jones, has any choice in the matter. We must trust our own minds about what is true, even if there is revealed truth. Purported revelations are a dime a dozen. As Mark Twain allegedly said, "Mankind has discovered the one true religion. Lots of `em." Why should we believe in Christ rather than Quetzalcoatl? The only possible answer is that our minds tell us that the Christian revelation is true and the Aztec one not. Hence, epistemological autonomy must be exercised to discover the true revelation, if there be any. Thus, it is Jones, not the non-Christian, who is in an epistemologically self-vitiation predicament.

In the main part of his article, Jones pillories Paul Kurtz, holding up Kurtz's book, The Transcendental Temptation, as exhibit number one in his prosecution of the case against non-Christian thought. Now Paul Kurtz is certainly capable of defending himself, so I would not have much to say here except for the fact that Jones tells us that Kurtz's errors are also common to such other atheistic miscreants as "Nielsen, Flew, Parsons, [and] Martin," What, then, are Kurtz's epistemic sins that we others have shared in?

Jones claims to perceive a tension in Kurtz's thought. On the one hand, Kurtz emphasizes the competence of the autonomous human mind to arrive at reliable knowledge: Science and common sense employ objective standards to arrive at reliable knowledge. On the other hand, Kurtz emphasizes the incompetence of human knower: There is much that we do not and perhaps cannot know. Epistemological standards change and we cannot ever say that human beliefs represent an absolutely correct picture of reality. Jones sees such alleged tensions as "horrendous epistemological conflicts."

What exactly is the problem here? How is my claim to know some things in any way vitiated by my admission that there are many things I do not know? Suppose I even admit that there are some things, like, say, how bread and wine can simultaneously be the body and blood of a man crucified 2000 years ago, that utterly transcend my understanding. Does my inability to fathom the mysteries of transubstantiation mean that I must, for instance, entertain serious doubts about the existence of gravity? Does the fact that epistemological standards change mean that I am incompetent to judge the validity of modus ponens?

Jones tells us that "If autonomous categories are so limited as to leave, now or forever, much of reality `unknowable' then Kurtz cannot speak with any boldness whatsoever about our present knowledge since there might be some factor in this unknown realm which makes our robust claim to knowledge false." In other words, if we don't know everything, we can't know anything. The fact that I cannot conclusively demonstrate that I am not a brain in a vat means, according to Jones, that I can make no confident claims to knowledge at all.

In short, Jones is reviving the old project of Descartes's Meditations: Knowledge is defined as absolute certainty. How, then, can we be absolutely certain that we are not the dupes of an evil genius, an omnipotent demon who amuses himself by making us err in all our knowledge claims? The only way, Descartes realized, is to become absolutely certain that an omnipotent good being exists who will not allow us to err in all our judgments about truth. But there's the rub; how can we be absolutely certain that such a good omnipotent being exists? Descartes's theistic "proofs" are embarrassingly weak, and his whole project founders on them.

As with Descartes, the only way out of the dilemma Jones sets for the secular thinker--absolute certainty or complete skepticism--is absolute certainty about the existence of God. Where, then, are Jones's proofs? To escape from the dilemma we must have absolutely indubitable theistic proofs, and Jones provides none. If Jones replies that, unlike Descartes, he does not equate knowledge with certainty, then what is the force of his objection to Kurtz? Why, in that case, cannot Kurtz and the rest of us make bold, confident knowledge claims even though we cannot be absolutely certain that they are not wrong?

Finally, and fatally, Jones's argument is self-defeating when addressed to non-Christians. Jones's conclusion is that non-Christian thought is futile. The non-Christian can evaluate this conclusion only by employing those very criteria and categories stigmatized as futile by that conclusion. Hence, if the conclusion is true, the non-Christian's attempt to evaluate the claim "all non-Christian thought is futile" is futile. It follows that if Jones's argument is sound, the non-Christian must necessarily lack rational grounds for accepting its conclusion. Surely I am justified in dismissing out of hand any argument that guarantees that I cannot rationally accept its conclusion.

In conclusion, Jones has shown absolutely no problems with the sort of fallibilistic epistemologies favored by many secular thinkers. Worse, an appeal to revelation, if it is not to be completely irrational, must be judged by the autonomous human mind. Without such judgements, what is Revealed Truth to you will only be hearsay to me. Finally, as a polemic directed to non-Christians, Jones's argument is an utterly self-defeating failure. Thus, in his effort to prove the futility of non-Christian thought, Jones only succeeds in tying himself in conceptual knots. There certainly is evidence of futility here, but not on the part of non-Christians.

Source
edit: for some reason, the source is the same text (though different link - same website ) as GW's first post. Scroll down to the bottom of the page and click the "NEXT" icon to see Parson's response

Christianity is a belief and not truth(standing alone) Add Science to the religion, it then becomes truth. I created a bunch of religion based theories on scientific discoveries. Science and religion are not completely different. Demons exist only in our minds. I try to use science to prove there is a god. I ain't biased, sometimes I myself don't believe something, I go to science and it proves that part of religion is there, but altered. Now, science says the core is 12,000 degrees and religion says hell is the core. So normally people would side one over the other. Now, if I'm correct, the earth in the center has a strong gravitational field. Objects can't pass through the earth's surface, but souls can, which is a form of intelligent concentrated energy. Now, since souls can travel through the surface, gravity is prone to pull them in. If I'm correct, the concentration of that energy should make the core hotter. Since we as humans can not sense heaven or hell, I am convinced that on a spirit level, the soul goes through torture, but we don't feel it. I know where I was before I was born, and it wasn't hell or heaven, I was in space looking at a nebula. But since the intelligence exists as the soul, I believe that a soul can block the gravitational force. It is the strength of the mind that trains the soul, so the weak ones will fall.... Eternal burning is not eternal since the earth is dated to have an end. When it disintigrates, a blackhole will form, sucking everything in, but that still isn't eternal, that too has an end because it explodes creating a new solar system. The souls are released to wander to the next habitable planet. The hell we fear most is our creator. Science has also discovered that super suns emit a low intelliegence energy. Only intelligent to create life on a habitable planet. Evolution occurs on need basis ans a spiritual to life basis. So the almighty god we are referring to is that minor source of intelligent energy... So really god is the devil and vise versa. They say god is so joyful if you follow his command and heaven is there for you(God). When you disobey him, he puts you into a firey hell(Devil). Be careful on how you believe things. The Church consumes you and your wealth and does everything put the word evil in your head. That's why poltergeist happen to religous people only!!!!!!!!!!! The Sub-Concious mind is being fed that stuff on a daily basis. Be-careful on what you feed your mind, you may be creating your own hell!!!!

Hahaha, oh wow. Its just what Christian fundies say all the time except broken down into bullsh*t reasons.

So typical. One of the most arrogant things I've ever read. Thank you for posting this so I could get a laugh.