Divine Command Theory

The divine command theory (DCT) of ethics holds that an act is either moral or immoral solely because God either commands us to do it or prohibits us from doing it, respectively. On DCT the only thing that makes an act morally wrong is that God prohibits doing it, and all that it means to say that torture is wrong is that God prohibits torture. DCT is wildly implausible for reasons best illustrated by the Euthyphro dilemma, which is based on a discussion of what it means for an act to be holy in Plato's Euthyphro. Substituting "moral wrongness" for "holiness" raises the dilemma: Is torture wrong because God prohibits it, or does God prohibit torture because it is already wrong?

While DCT takes the the first route, Euthyphro takes the last one: If a good God prohibits torture he does so because torture is intrinsicly wrong, not merely because he declares torture to be wrong by fiat. But if torture is intrinsicly wrong, then it is wrong regardless of whether or not God exists. Either certain acts are wrong regardless of anyone's opinions or commands (including God's), or else all that we mean by "torture is wrong" is "God prohibits torture." Rather than grounding the objectivity of ethics, DCT completely undermines it by insisting that God's commands (like those of individuals or societies) do not require justification in terms of any external principles.

DCT is thus a kind of moral relativism: what's right or wrong is what one's God (like one's self or one's society) says is right or wrong--and there are no moral standards apart from this. Yet if God said that 2+2=100, 2+2=100 would nonetheless be false because 2+2=4 is true regardless of what God says. The same point holds for moral propositions like "inflicting unnecessary suffering solely for fun is wrong." If that proposition is true, then it is true regardless of whether God commands or prohibits inflicting such suffering.

If there is no standard of "being morally right" apart from God's commands, then God could literally command us to do anything and it would be right for us to do it by definition. Whatever God commands becomes the standard of moral rightness, and there are no moral values external to God to constrain what he would or would not command. So if God commanded one person to rape another, DCT entails that that rape would be moral because "doing the right thing" is logically equivalent to "doing what God commands." A highly implausible implication is that it is impossible to even imagine God commanding a wrong act. What counts as moral or immoral behavior on DCT is completely subjective--dependent upon God's fiat--and thus arbitrary.

While some retort that goodness flows from God's nature, this merely changes the form of the dilemma: Is compassion good because it is a part of God's nature, or is compassion a part of God's nature because it is already good? The first option produces problems parallel to those for DCT. If malice were a part of God's nature, for instance, it is doubtful that malice would automatically be good. If there are any objective moral standards at all, then a god can be either good or evil, and the assessment of a god's character would depend upon appealing to standards independent of any god's commands, opinions, statements, nature, or character.


(Further Reading/Sources) (scroll to end of page)

the argument doesn't make sense... and i'll give you one single reason...

war... NOBODY'S god that i know of has ever told people to just go out and start a war whenever you feel like it...

so is war morally wrong or morally right?

War is something we naturally do because we're naturally violent little creatures.

That sisde steps the question that was asked.

No, I don't see it sidestepping the question that was asked. I see the question that was asked as subterfuge to divert attention from the statements that were made. Therefore, it's just as valid as someone asking the question because they cant accept what is said.

God ordered enough wars in the OT, so if war is morally wrong god is immoral. And if war is morally right then god sponsors a morality that involves all the effects of war.
Holy War in the Bible

actually it is relevant... because the author was saying that morality is based on rules of God or gods...

and you are still side stepping the question... you're above statement is saying the same thing the article said...

what i'm asking is about war NOT sanctioned by God or gods...

wars people decide to start... are they morally wrong or right?

It wasn't my responsibility to answer the question you posed to someone not me.

Wars are wrong and right at the same time in a way.


If I waged war on you it would be wrong in your eyes but I would see it as right. So at that moment war was morally right and wrong.

If you waged war on a defenceless people you could see that as morally right but I could see it as morally wrong but then I would wage war on you to protect the defenceless people which to me would seem the morally right thing to do.


So I guess war is morally right and wrong when it suits people.

but you did see it as your responsibility to butt in and not answer the question?

You will note I answered a question, so it's not a matter of butting in. I said I didn't answer a question not posed to me, because I already answered the one that was.

didn't you say



i don't recall that being posed to you...

I doubt you recall post #2. A question posed to me that posted the article whereby you came by your question about war and morality. A question proffered by inference on my part, and generally to anyone else that enters this thread.

Another point of view: Theological Voluntarism

First published Tue 2 Jul, 2002
There is a class of metaethical and normative views that commonly goes by the name ‘divine command theory.’ What all members of this class have in common is that they hold that what God wills is relevant to determining the moral status of some set of entities (acts, states of affairs, character traits, etc., or some combination of these). But the name ‘divine command theory’ is a bit misleading: what these views have in common is their appeal to the divine will; while many of these views hold that the relevant act of divine will is that of commanding, some deny it. So we would do well to have a label for this class of views that does not prejudge the issue of the relevant act of divine will. The label that I will use, following Quinn 1990, is ‘theological voluntarism.’

I have three aims in this article. I want first to distinguish metaethical versions of theological voluntarism from normative versions of that view, putting to the side normative versions. Second, I will say something about the main lines of defense of theological voluntarism, the various theoretical options that confront defenders of theological voluntarism, and some of the reasons for affirming or rejecting these different possible formulations. And finally I will say a bit about the sort of difficulties that seem to confront any such views. (I do not, however, give an account of the history of theological voluntarism in moral philosophy; for an anthology of readings covering a broad swath of this history, see Idziak 1979.) (continues at link)

Ok, I've got a thumping headache (banged my head on the door frame... ouch!... so I may not have grasped the contents of the article... steer me in the right direction if that's the case please ).

I believe that we were created by a creator who gave us the ability to reason. We have the ability to use reason to develop moral/ethical principles and these principles can be used to implement moral behavior.

If morality is subject to divine will then wouldn't our moral code remain unaltered regardless of the passage of time and change in laws, etc.? If you look at some of the passages in the Bible it's clear that women were considered as nothing more than posessions, to be "taken" as wives or considered the spoils of war, etc. If morality was subject to divine will then the moral code of mankind during the lifetime of Moses would have remained fixed and we would all live by the same one now wouldn't we? Our values have changed as time has passed... and the moral perspective of someone living in the UK isn't the same as someone living in Saudi Arabia, or in China.

Am I not getting this? Don't forget... bump to head...

LMAO I never thought I'd see the day where a chrsitian tells a non chrsitian they are side stepping a question lol


just kidding LOL

Indeed! ~offers aspirin for headache~ But that's the tract of that particular discussion. If one believes, as affirmed by the Psalms, that the law of the LORD is perfect, converting the soul: the testimony of the LORD is sure, making wise the simple, then the moral codes would remain the same. One could still assault their wife, kill their children for disobedience, etc... I think the topic of divine command authority, or theological voluntarism, is interesting in it attempts to explain what is essentially fundamentalism.