QUOTE(Lanton @ Apr 18 2007, 01:10 PM) [snapback]1634946[/snapback]
9/11 was the biggest, most complicated and successful terrorist operation in history. The operators who carried it out had to first get into the US unseen (which they did), conduct flight-training unnoticed (which they did), move around the country unhindered and, again, unnoticed (which they did), board the target planes, subdue the crew and passengers and fly the aircraft into four targets, located in two different cities. The fact that they only managed to take out three of the four targets doesn't detract from the fact that it took considerable operational experience and skill, on the part of the operators, to carry out the 9/11 attacks.
The planners did not enter the US unseen, some were tracked as suspected terrorists.
They did not conduct flight training unnoticed (and certainly shouldn't have expected to given their use of military facilities); Moussaoui was arrested on immigration charges following concerns raised at his flight school that he wanted to learn how to fly but not to take off or land a plane. His arrest, coming just a month before 9/11, should have given the hijackers cause for great concern and even a change of plan. But it didn't.
Yes, they achieved a 100% boarding rate, despite some of them setting off alarms.
Yes, they achived a 75% hit rate - the only failure, you'll notice, being the aircraft that took off 40 minutes late. You would have me believe that they were cognisant of US intelligence, airport security and air defence inadequacies, yet they had no contingency plan in respect of Flight 93. Why did they even bother hijacking it? They must have known that, given the attacks were likely well under way by the time Flight 93 even took-off, this plane stood no chance of reaching its target as a result of the headstart this delay would give air defences.
QUOTE(Lanton @ Apr 18 2007, 01:10 PM) [snapback]1634946[/snapback]
Then there was the planning side of the operation - the operators had to board and hijack the right sort of planes flying out of particular airports for the targets (New York and Washington). The aircraft used had to be loaded with aviation fuel, so they had to be at the beginning of their trips. The aircraft would have to be going the longest possible distance in order to have the greatest fuel load. Since aircraft traveling on over-ocean trips receive special scrutiny and require passports for boarding, intercontinental aircraft were out of the question. That meant that transcontinental aircraft would have to be used. Also, any attack had to involve East Coast targets - Washington and New York could not be left out of the attack - so the aircraft chosen must take off from East Coast cities. Transcontinental flights take off from Boston, New York, Phili and Washington airports. Other Eastern cities reach the West Coast through airline hub cities like Houston. Another limiting factor the planners had to deal with - the attacks had to be carried out with near simultaneity. A single hijacking would be noted by the air traffic controllers and immediately passed on to all pilots. These pilots might or might not increase their alertness, but two hijackings noted by air traffic control would galvanize the system. Everyone would become extremely alert. The weapons that the operatives used were effective but ultimately could be defended against. If the pilots realised that a hijacking wave was under way, and certainly if they realised that a wave of suicide attacks was under way, they might be able to resist the hijackers. Therefore, the hijackings needed to take place nearly at the same time, the impacts ought to occur nearly at the same time, and, if possible, air traffic control should not know that hijackings were under way until as late as possible.
These are assessments that any fool could have made. The problem is, even a cursory examination of events shows that none of the synchrocity required to bewilder ATC's occurred. For example:
Flight 11Last radio communication - 8:14
Transponder turned off - 8:21
Impact time - 8:46
Flight 175Last radio communication - 8:42
Transponder turned off - 8:47
Impact time - 9:03
Flight 77Last radio communication - 8:51
Transponder turned off - 8:56
Impact time - 9:37
Flight 93Last radio communication - 9:27
Transponder turned off - 9:41
Impact time - 10:03
And we still have the small matter of Atta and Co catching a connecting flight on the morning of the attack, leaving his ability to participate dependent upon unnecesarily uncontrollable factors.
QUOTE(Lanton @ Apr 18 2007, 01:10 PM) [snapback]1634946[/snapback]
You keep saying that "no one would plan to succeed based solely upon his opponent's failure", and no-one's claimed that. The 9/11 planners and operators were experienced and skilled enough to follow the plan through to a successful conclusion - it also helped that they knew that the US intelligence community was none the wiser (they were hugely familiar with the deficiencies of the CIA and it's sister agencies).
I keep saying this because you keep asserting something that, to my mind, is utterly discordant with the evidence. These alleged hijackers did not behave in a manner consistent with that of skilled and experienced operatives, trained in the business of counter-intelligence. They were exposed at every step of the operation in a way that would have cause anyone as competent as you claim these hijackers were to suspect they would be prevented for carrying out their mission.