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Afghan U.S Cargo Plane Mystery Solved :Video


NatureBoff

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747 cargo plane crashes at Bagram airbase - video (

Footage purports to show the moment a Boeing 747 US cargo plane crashes on its ascent from Bagram airbase, Afghanistan on Monday. The crash has resulted in the death of all seven American crew members on board. The exact cause of the crash is unknown, although there were thunderstorms in the area. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating the crash.

Second U.S. Cargo Plane Crashes in Central Asia

For the second time this week an American cargo plane has crashed overseas, after a military jet has gone missing in Kyrgyzstan. The C-135 fuel transporter disappeared from radar on Friday, shortly after taking off from a U.S. air base near the Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan border. Kyrgyz emergency services say the plane has crashed, but there is no word yet on casualties...

On Monday, a civilian operated-cargo plane crashed upon take off from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, killing all seven crew members. The plane was owned and operated by a private company (and the crew were all U.S. civilians), but was contracted to the U.S. military.

Fate of crew unknown as US plane crashes in Kyrgyzstan (3 May 2012)

Kyrgyz officials said the plane had taken off from the US transit centre at Manas international airport, near Bishkek, with some 70 tonnes of fuel on board.

What Caused The Dealy Cargo Plane Disaster?

I propose that a roaming mystery force acts on fluid bodies only. This would explain the sudden force of attraction on the fuel laden planes. The video of the bagram airbase disaster is due to the fluid air inside the cargo bay being pressurised by this force and blowing out the rear door. I predict that there is a single rear door which hinges to the right. This pressure explosion was forced out down and to the left which resulted in a reaction force up and to the right which stalled the plane. It gives the impression of a cargo shift, but analysis will show that this didn't actually occur.

The hypothesis could be easily tested. It predicts that the mystery flyby anomaly of some passing satellites is relative to the amount of fluids they have on board.

Edited by RingFenceTheCity
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The hypothesis can also be easily tested by Gravity or Magnetic Hills. There's a youtube vid where the man exclaims that the speed is slower on his new car compared to last time. I suspect that this is because he had a full fuel tank last time! The mystery force works on fluids, not metal.

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I'd say a cargo shift on takeoff for a few reasons:

1. They obviously had hands full right after takeoff, because they never even bothered to raise the gear. That would be the first thing right after rotation.

2. The aircraft has an extremely high angle of attack, consistent with a rearward cargo shift.

3. Even when the plane stalled, they were able to turn the wings level in an attempt to pull the plane out of the dive.

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The title interested me, until I realised it was started by this guy...

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I'd say a cargo shift on takeoff for a few reasons:

1. They obviously had hands full right after takeoff, because they never even bothered to raise the gear. That would be the first thing right after rotation.

2. The aircraft has an extremely high angle of attack, consistent with a rearward cargo shift.

3. Even when the plane stalled, they were able to turn the wings level in an attempt to pull the plane out of the dive.

The cargo shift is the most instantly recognisable solution I agree, but I suspect that a disciplined army unit in a combat zone would be able to secure a load as routine. The post-accident analysis will be closed to the mainstream for some time to come I suspect.
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Not totally convinced on the mystery powers at work here but a part of me also believes that those who die in accidents maybe secretly already wanted to die and got their wish come true.

Could this be the mystery force?

Of course not.

It was just an accident.

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Not totally convinced on the mystery powers at work here but a part of me also believes that those who die in accidents maybe secretly already wanted to die and got their wish come true.

Could this be the mystery force?

Of course not.

It was just an accident.

But you haven't analysed the data have you? There are plenty of cases where the rear doors of aircraft have come loose and set off the indicators in the cockpit. There's been major accidents because of this. It's happened enought times that the AAIB must be considering the issue for sure.

Here's a classic example Turkish Airlines Flight 981

The crash resulted from the rear cargo hatch blowing off, causing decompression and severing cables that left the pilots with almost no control. The hatches used manual procedures to ensure they were locked correctly. Problems with the hatches had previously occurred. Investigation showed that these procedures were open to abuse, by forcing the handle shut without the pins being in place. It was noted that the pins had been filed down, making it easier to close the door, but leaving it less resistant to pressure. Also a support-plate for the handle-linkage had not been installed, although this work had been signed-off. Finally the latching had been performed by a Moroccan baggage-handler who could not read the relevant notices, in Turkish or English. After the disaster, the latches were re-designed and the locking system significantly upgraded.

The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder showed that the first hint the flight crew had of any problem was a muffled report that took place just after the aircraft passed over Meaux. That sound was followed by a loud rush of air, and the throttle for the tail-mounted Number 2 engine snapped shut at the same moment. At some point, one of the crew pressed his microphone button, broadcasting the pandemonium in the cockpit on the departure frequency.

The aircraft quickly attained a 20-degree, nose-down attitude, and started picking up speed, while Captain Nejat Berkoz and First Officer Oral Ulusman struggled to gain control. As its speed increased, the additional lift started to raise the nose again. Berkoz called "Speed!", and once more started to push the throttles forward, in order to level off. It was too late, however, and 72 seconds after decompression, the airliner slammed into the forest at a speed of about 430 knots (490 mph; 800 km/h), in a slight left turn. The speed of the impact caused the airliner to disintegrate.

The wreckage was so fragmented that it was difficult to tell whether any parts of the aircraft were missing. An air traffic controller noted that as the flight was cleared to FL230, he had briefly seen a second echo on his radar, remaining stationary behind the aircraft. A farmer soon telephoned in; the rear cargo hold hatch beneath the floor, portions of the interior floor, and six passenger seats, still holding dead passengers, had landed in a turnip field near the town of Saint-Pathus, approximately 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) south of the main crash site.

French investigators determined that the rear cargo hold hatch had failed in flight, and the cargo area had decompressed. The resulting difference in air pressure between the cargo area and the pressurized passenger cabin above it, which amounted to several 2 psi or 14 kPa, caused a section of the cabin floor above the open hatch to fail and blow out through the hatch, along with the passenger seats attached to the floor section. Control cables that ran beneath the section of floor were severed, and the pilots lost the ability to control the airliner's elevators, rudder, and Number 2 engine. Loss of control of these key components was then catastrophic to the pilots' ability to control the entire aircraft.

Lloyd's of London insurance syndicate, which covered Douglas Aircraft, retained Failure Analysis Associates (now Exponent, Inc.) to investigate the accident as well. In the company's investigation, Dr. Alan Tetelman noted that the pins on the cargo door had been filed down. He learned that on a stop in Turkey, the ground crews had had trouble closing the door. After less than 14 inches (6.4 mm) had been taken off the pins, they were able to close it effortlessly. It was proven by tests that the door subsequently yielded to about 15 pounds per square inch (100 kPa) of pressure, in contrast to the 300 pounds per square inch (2,100 kPa) that it had been designed to withstand.[8]

The passenger doors on the DC-10 are of the plug door variety, which prevents the doors from opening while the aircraft is pressurized. The cargo hatch, however, is not. Owing to its large radius, the cargo hatch on the DC-10 could not be swung inside the fuselage without taking up a considerable amount of valuable cargo space. Instead, the hatch was swung outward, allowing cargo to be stored directly behind it. The outward-opening design allowed the hatch, in the event of a latch failure, to be blown open by the pressure inside the cargo area. To prevent that, the DC-10 used a latching system held in place by "over-center latches" - four C-shaped latches mounted on a common torque shaft that were rotated over latching pins ("spools") fixed to the aircraft fuselage. Due to their shapes, when the latches are in the proper position, pressure on the hatch does not place any torque on them that could cause them to open, and they actually further seat onto the pins. The latches were engaged by electric actuators, with a hand crank provided as a back-up.

To ensure this rotation was complete and the latches were in the proper position, the DC-10 cargo hatch design included a separate locking mechanism that consisted of small locking pins that slid behind flanges on the lock torque tube (which transferred the actuator force to the latch hooks through a linkage). When the locking pins were in place, any rotation of the latches would cause the torque tube flanges to contact the locking pins, making further rotation impossible. The pins were pushed into place by an operating handle on the outside of the hatch. If the latches were not properly closed the pins would strike the torque tube flanges and the handle would remain open, visually indicating a problem. Additionally, the handle moved a metal plug into a vent cut in the outer hatch panel: if the vent was not plugged the fuselage would not retain pressure, eliminating any pneumatic force on the hatch. Also, there was an indicator light in the cockpit that would remain lit if the cargo hatch was not correctly latched, controlled by a switch actuated by the locking pin mechanism.

The cargo door design flaw, and the consequences of a resulting in-flight decompression, had been noted by Convair engineer Dan Applegate in a 1972 memo,[citation needed] written after American Airlines Flight 96, another DC-10, had its cargo hatch open and separate in flight. In the ensuing investigation it was discovered that the handlers had forced the locking handle closed in spite of the fact that the latches had not fully engaged, because of an electrical problem. The incident investigators discovered that the rod connecting the pins to the handle was weak enough that it could be bent with repeated operation and some force being applied, allowing the baggage handler to close the handle with his knee in spite of the pins interfering with the torque tube flanges. Both the vent plug and cockpit light were operated by the handle or the locking pins, not the latches, so when the handle was stowed both of these warning systems indicated that the door was properly closed. In the case of Flight 96, the airliner was able to make a safe emergency landing as not all the underfloor cables had been severed, thus allowing the pilots limited control.see 'loading'

In the aftermath of the Flight 96 incident, the NTSB made several recommendations. Its primary concern was the addition of venting in the rear cabin floor that would ensure that a cargo area decompression would equalize the cabin area, and not place additional loads onto the floor. In fact, most of the DC-10 fuselage had vents like these: it was only the rearmost hold that lacked them. Additionally, the NTSB suggested that upgrades to the locking mechanism and to the latching actuator electrical system be made compulsory. However, while the FAA agreed that the locking and electrical systems should be upgraded, the FAA also agreed with McDonnell Douglas that the additional venting would be too expensive to implement, and the FAA did not demand that this change be made.

TC-JAV had been ordered three months after the service bulletin was issued, and been delivered to Turkish Airlines three months after that. Despite this, the changes required by the service bulletin (installation of a support plate for the handle linkage, preventing the bending of the linkage seen in the Flight 96 incident) had not been implemented. The interconnecting linkage between the lock and the latch hooks had not been upgraded. Through either deliberate fraud or oversight, the construction logs nevertheless showed that this work had been carried out. However, an improper adjustment had been made to the locking pin and warning light mechanism, causing the locking pin travel to be reduced. This meant that the pins did not extend past the torque tube flanges, allowing the handle to be closed without excessive force (estimated by investigators to be around 50 lbf or 220 N) despite the improperly engaged latches. This matches the comments made by Mohammed Mahmoudi, the baggage handler who had closed the door on Flight 981, who noted that no particular amount of force was needed to close the locking handle. Changes had also been made to the warning light switch, so that it would turn off the cockpit warning light even if the handle was not fully closed.

The fix that was implemented by McDonnell Douglas after the American Airlines Flight 96 incident was the addition of a small window that allowed the baggage handlers to visually inspect the pins, confirming they were in the correct position, and placards were added to show the correct and incorrect positions of the pins. This modification had been carried out on TC-JAV. However, Mahmoudi had not been advised as to what the indicator window was for. He had been told that as long as the door latch handle stowed correctly and the vent flap closed at the same time, the door was safe. Furthermore, the instructions regarding the indicator window were posted on the aircraft in English and Turkish, but the Algerian-born Mahmoudi, who could read and write three languages fluently, could not read either language.

It was normally the duty of either the airliner's flight engineer or the chief ground engineer of Turkish Airlines to ensure that all cargo and passenger doors were securely closed before takeoff. In this case, the airline did not have a ground engineer on duty at the time of the accident, and the flight engineer for Flight 981 failed to check the door personally. Although French media members called for Mahmoudi to be arrested, the crash investigators stated that it was unrealistic to expect an untrained, low-paid baggage handler who could not read the warning sticker (due to the language difference) to be responsible for the safety of the aircraft.

Outward-opening cargo hatches are inherently not fail-safe. An inward-opening hatch (a plug door) that is unlatched will not fly open, because the difference in air pressure between the aircraft cabin and the air outside will seal the hatch shut. However, an outward-opening, non-plug type hatch needs to be locked shut to prevent any unwanted opening. This makes it particularly important that the locking mechanisms be secure. American Airlines Flight 96 experienced the same problem before the Flight 981 accident, but the NTSB's recommendations to prevent it from happening again were not implemented by any airline. As a result, now whenever the NTSB comes up with recommendations to prevent certain accidents from happening, they talk to the FAA. Consequently, the FAA may issue an Airworthiness Directive to help prevent certain types of accidents from happening. However, NTSB and FAA are two independent Federal agencies, and the FAA is not obligated to act on NTSB recommendations. Aircraft types other than the DC-10 have also experienced catastrophic failures of a hatch. The Boeing 747 has experienced several such incidents. The most noteworthy of which occurred on United Airlines Flight 811 in February 1989, when the cargo hatch failed and caused a section of the fuselage to fail and resulted in the deaths of nine passengers expelled from the aircraft.

Edited by RingFenceTheCity
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The cargo shift is the most instantly recognisable solution I agree, but I suspect that a disciplined army unit in a combat zone would be able to secure a load as routine. The post-accident analysis will be closed to the mainstream for some time to come I suspect.

I'm sure they could, but **** happens. People make mistakes, straps break, etc. The loadmaster was a civilian by the way.

Another theory that's being talked about is bad fuel leading to the engines stalling.

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I'm sure they could, but **** happens. People make mistakes, straps break, etc. The loadmaster was a civilian by the way.

Another theory that's being talked about is bad fuel leading to the engines stalling.

"Bad fuel", that's a new one. I suspect that the fuel actually became 'magnetised' by a mystery force eminating from Fluid Matter (formerly known as Dark Matter). So good fuel in but "bad fuel" after the roaming mystery force has acted on it. Maybe a simple mixing device is needed in the tanks to prevent such an event from happening again. Let's wait and see. There's going to be more mystery accidents in the near future.

My condolences to all those family members of lost crew and passengers.

Edited by RingFenceTheCity
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"Bad fuel", that's a new one. I suspect that the fuel actually became 'magnetised' by a mystery force eminating from Fluid Matter (formerly known as Dark Matter). So good fuel in but "bad fuel" after the roaming mystery force has acted on it. Maybe a simple mixing device is needed in the tanks to prevent such an event from happening again. Let's wait and see. There's going to be more mystery accidents in the near future.

My condolences to all those family members of lost crew and passengers.

Yeah.....I think I'll just go with water in the fuel.

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Yeah.....I think I'll just go with water in the fuel.

And how do you think that that may have happened?

The Heathrow emergency landing of an airbus A319 this morning which had an engine cowling blown off and the engine catch fire is eerily reminiscent. I doubt whether "water in the fuel" is a contender for this one.

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The aircraft had previously flown from Sola, Norway nr Stavanger. I did a quick search for mystery incidents and came up with this one which has a tell-tale "downdraft" element to it, reminiscent of other mystery crashes. It was trying to land in the Shetland Islands, which is enroute to Heathrow from Norway.

WARWICK BV520 - 281 SQ. 17.11.44 WEST VOE,SHETLAND

281Sqnew.jpg

warwick1.jpg

The Warwick was returning from an ASR patrol when due to an engine failure he was attempting to land at Sumburgh, however he was not lined up for the runway on approach,he did another circuit in order to find alignment but got caught in a downdraught from Sumburgh Head, the pilot was unable to maintain correct height and speed on one engine and forced to ditch in West Voe,one crew member Sgt Roberts drowned,rest were saved.

Edited by RingFenceTheCity
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I've just discovered a very similar incident to the U.S Cargo plane video, Egypt and USA clash over Flash 737 crash findings (2006)

This has resulted in a list of possible contributing factors which might have led the 737 to suddenly roll to the right while executing a climbing left turn, less than three minutes after departing for Cairo en route to Paris. The aircraft, heading out over the Red Sea at night, entered a dive from which it failed to recover. All 148 occupants were killed.

There's a reference to yet another mystery aircraft crash from New York in 1999 EgyptAir Flight 990. My instinct is that this was a lizard-bird/ufo incident.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the Captain excusing himself to go to the lavatory, followed thirty seconds later by the First Officer saying in Egyptian Arabic "Tawkalt ala Allah", which translates to "I rely on God." A minute later, the autopilot was disengaged, immediately followed by the First Officer again saying, "I rely on God." Three seconds later, the throttles for both engines were reduced to idle, and both elevators were moved three degrees nose down. The First Officer repeated "I rely on God" seven more times before the Captain is suddenly heard to ask repeatedly, "What's happening, what's happening?" The flight data recorder reflected that the elevators then moved into a split condition, with the left elevator up and the right elevator down; a condition which is expected to result when the two control columns are subjected to at least 50 lbs of opposing force.[1] At this point, both engines were shut down by moving the start levers from run to cutoff. The Captain asked, "What is this? What is this? Did you shut the engines?" The First Officer did not respond. The Captain repeatedly stated, "Pull with me" but the FDR data indicated that the elevator surfaces remained in a split condition (with the left surface commanding nose up and the right surface commanding nose down) until the FDR and CVR stopped recording. There were no other aircraft in the area. There was no indication that an explosion occurred on board. The engines operated normally for the entire flight until they were shut down. From the presence of a western debris field about 1,200 feet (370 m) from the eastern debris field, the NTSB concluded that the left engine and some small pieces of wreckage separated from the airplane at some point before water impact.[1]

Edited by RingFenceTheCity
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It's about time that all commercial pilots should wear brain monitoring helmets as a biological blackbox-like recorder for these mystery incidents.

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And how do you think that that may have happened?

The Heathrow emergency landing of an airbus A319 this morning which had an engine cowling blown off and the engine catch fire is eerily reminiscent. I doubt whether "water in the fuel" is a contender for this one.

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The aircraft had previously flown from Sola, Norway nr Stavanger. I did a quick search for mystery incidents and came up with this one which has a tell-tale "downdraft" element to it, reminiscent of other mystery crashes. It was trying to land in the Shetland Islands, which is enroute to Heathrow from Norway.

You clearly have no idea what you're talking about and given how others have reacted to your posts, I'm not the only one who thinks this.

You seem to think that contaminated fuel is far fetched, but it's not. Do you know that when Air Force One deploys withe the President that they bring their own fuel with them for this very reason?

I'm done with this troll thread.

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You seem to think that contaminated fuel is far fetched, but it's not. Do you know that when Air Force One deploys withe the President that they bring their own fuel with them for this very reason?

Okay, okay, thanks for the information. It's obviously going to be more expensive the more secure the quality and authenicity of the fuel is. That's a potential problem, agreed, but when that doesn't fit it's time to think left-field imv.
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It's about time that all commercial pilots should wear brain monitoring helmets as a biological blackbox-like recorder for these mystery incidents.

Pal, a load shift is not a "mystery incident".

Get real.

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Pal, a load shift is not a "mystery incident".

Get real.

No-one has officially said it's a load shift, or unofficially for that matter.
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No-one has officially said it's a load shift, or unofficially for that matter.

and no one for your theory so.....

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