What Science Can't Prove

[Stubbly_Dooright]

You are imagining things.

And your name means mirage, that's funny. I'm imagining things.

Where did i say that i want everyone to answer my questions?

Then don't ask the questions.

Its obvious your greatest source of confusion stems from your own mind

Nope, don't so, but you wont believe that, will you?

, so if you want answers, consider why do you think that is? This is not a riddle, its a clue.

Considering I can't depend any from you, why bother.

Meanwhile........going back to the OP, where is she? Did she start this thread, so she can participate? I really would like to know her view of all the varying posts on here.

[Mr Walker]

Right but we still can control the on and off of the collapse of the wave function. A simple matter of turning the detectors on and off. We could simply turn them on and off using A code like mores code right? Is there something wrong with my thinking on this? I imagine avoiding interference of an entangled beam over distances is challenging but it seems like the principals are still there.

I am not sure scientifically, but i know that any coded system devised by man can eventually be broken by man, and I think eventually we would be able to break this form of code without leaving a trace that we had done so.

[danielost]

I am not sure scientifically, but i know that any coded system devised by man can eventually be broken by man, and I think eventually we would be able to break this form of code without leaving a trace that we had done so.

there is a math problem, i think 300 years old. no one but the person who posed the question has been able to solve it.

[Gromdor]

This problem? http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/27/german-teen-solves-300-year-old-mathematical-riddle-posed-by-sir-isaac-newton/

[taniwha]

Meanwhile........going back to the OP, where is she? Did she start this thread, so she can participate? I really would like to know her view of all the varying posts on here.

Your welcome, go ahead, annoy her instead

[+Sherapy]

But is that necessary to satisfy the conditions of 'proving an ontologically contingent claim'?

Isn't it only necessary that Rene proves to himself that he exists? And, in stating "cogito, ergo sum", he did.

He showed, whether it was his intent to do so or not, that such a claim can be 'proved' - provided both the claim and proof are personal, or perhaps common. His statement is so powerful because every conscious entity capable of understanding the concept "I", agrees upon it's meaning or definition. So, to every such conscious entity, his pronouncement is the proof of their existence.

The problem we have with concepts such as 'god', however, is that there is no common agreement upon what 'god' is - how 'god' is defined.

So, the problem becomes one of language. It is through language that we define everything that we can know, and it is through the belief in a common 'meaning' of any concept that the existence of something may be 'proved'. This is why I claimed belief defines existence.

Sheri,

The problem, as I explained above, is not with science but with the concept of 'god' (i.e. language). If all beings could agree a specific (common) meaning or definition for this concept then it is eminently possible science could be used (depending on that definition) to prove the existence of 'god'. However, as it stands we can only use science to prove the existence of 'this god' or 'that god' - not 'god'.

I don't know if you have read or heard Descartes proof in its entirety (and it is not nessecarily you do), because I am certain you are familiar with it, and I am also certain you know it was a common strategy in his day to prove things (God) ontologically. And, that this strategy is alive and well to this day. What he brought to the table was the desire to go beyond this and ask what can we know with absolute certainty, he put an intellectual solution into place to deal with this namely, Science/Religion. The interesting thing to me is we are all still asking questions using different strategies to answer them. Where once there was no distinction, now there is and we are still trying to answer Decartes original inquiry. What can we know for sure? With that being said, where I think you make a great point is how refreshing it would be if what we could/did know for sure was as simple as agreeing on a definition.

Edited October 22, 2014 by Sherapy

[Frank Merton]

there is a math problem, i think 300 years old. no one but the person who posed the question has been able to solve it.

You are out of date; the problem has been solved and the person who thought he had solved it was almost certainly wrong. I forget the name of the damn thing.

[Frank Merton]

Ontological proofs of God can be devilishly clever, and almost always resolve into a word game (confusing subtly different meanings of a given word, such as the word "perfect").

That Descartes went on after "proving" that he exists to claim this also applies to God was I don't think what he actually thought -- his argument makes no sense -- in fact is more just an assertion than an argument -- and he was a better thinker than that. I think he put it in just to stay out of trouble with the religious dogmatists and authorities.

[danielost]

This problem? http://www.foxnews.c...r-isaac-newton/

no, newton didn't have anything to do with it. but, i am glad for this young man and his math ability. the problem as i remember was written in the margin of a book.

[Mr Walker]

You are out of date; the problem has been solved and the person who thought he had solved it was almost certainly wrong. I forget the name of the damn thing.

Would it be Fermat's last theorem ?

Fermat's last theorem is a theorem first proposed by Fermat in the form of a note scribbled in the margin of his copy of the ancient Greek text Arithmetica by Diophantus. The scribbled note was discovered posthumously, and the original is now lost. However, a copy was preserved in a book published by Fermat's son. In the note, Fermat claimed to have discovered a proof that the Diophantine equation has no integer solutions for and .

The full text of Fermat's statement, written in Latin, reads "Cubum autem in duos cubos, aut quadrato-quadratum in duos quadrato-quadratos, et generaliter nullam in infinitum ultra quadratum potestatem in duos eiusdem nominis fas est dividere cuius rei demonstrationem mirabilem sane detexi. Hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet" (Nagell 1951, p. 252). In translation, "It is impossible for a cube to be the sum of two cubes, a fourth power to be the sum of two fourth powers, or in general for any number that is a power greater than the second to be the sum of two like powers. I have discovered a truly marvelous demonstration of this proposition that this margin is too narrow to contain."

In 1993, a bombshell was dropped. In that year, the general theorem was partially proven by Andrew Wiles (Cipra 1993, Stewart 1993) by proving the semistable case of the Taniyama-Shimura conjecture. Unfortunately, several holes were discovered in the proof shortly thereafter when Wiles' approach via the Taniyama-Shimura conjecture became hung up on properties of the Selmer group using a tool called an Euler system. However, the difficulty was circumvented by Wiles and R. Taylor in late 1994 (Cipra 1994, 1995) and published in Taylor and Wiles (1995) and Wiles (1995). Wiles' proof succeeds by (1) replacing elliptic curves with Galois representations, (2) reducing the problem to a class number formula, (3) proving that formula, and (4) tying up loose ends that arise because the formalisms fail in the simplest degenerate cases (Cipra 1995).

The proof of Fermat's Last Theorem marks the end of a mathematical era. Since virtually all of the tools which were eventually brought to bear on the problem had yet to be invented in the time of Fermat, it is interesting to speculate about whether he actually was in possession of an elementary proof of the theorem. Judging by the tenacity with which the problem resisted attack for so long, Fermat's alleged proof seems likely to have been illusionary. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Fermat searched for proofs for the cases and , which would have been superfluous had he actually been in possession of a general proof.

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/FermatsLastTheorem.html

Edited October 22, 2014 by Mr Walker

[eight bits]

daniel, Frank, Mr Walker, and others...

What a real proof is like cannot be too far off-topic.

It is interesting to speculate whether Fermat (1601-1665; compare Descartes, 1596-1650) did have a valid elementary proof. Although when the theorem is stated formally, it sounds cold and dry, it asserts something profound about the Pythagorean Theorem, and about the plane, and about the number of two (which has many interesting and useful uniquenesses).

...virtually all of the tools which were eventually brought to bear on the problem had yet to be invented in the time of Fermat, ...

... is irrelevant to what Fermat did. Mathematical history is full of proofs and reproofs of the same theorems. Goddess only knows how many distinct published proofs of the Pythagorean Theorem there are. It is also not unusual for the first published proof of a theorem to be a three-ring circus, and later work reveals more elegant solutions. This case would be remarkable only in that if Fermat's statement is true, then an early simple proof was lost rather than published.

Part of the interest for this topic is that, as I mentioned, the standards for proof got stricter over the time that the conjecture was open. It is entirely possible that Fermat had a "marvelous proof," possbly based on "meaning," that wasn't looked for later, since it wouldn't count as a proof later, just as cogito ergo sum isn't a proof, but might well have been back then.

In closing, I am especially unpersuaded by the observation

Fermat searched for proofs for the cases n = 4 and n = 3 {the source says "5", but 3 was the other power Fermat mentioned} which would have been superfluous had he actually been in possession of a general proof.

That's not the evidence. The proofs for small powers are (as these things go) fairly easy. Fermat simply said, in a note presumably addressed to himself, that these cases were decided.

As George Polya pointed out, it is not unusual for mathematicians to look at easy cases first, to decide whether a more general problem is worth working on. Thus, it would not be unusual for Fermat to have looked at the first two cases as a first step in his investigations. It is also possible that one or both of the special cases served as the required base case(s) in a proof by induction, a common thing to use when proving facts about the integrers.

[Leonardo]

I would agree. I accept logically that an individual can ascertain or prove concrete truths without validation from others. Proof is innate using a process. It doesn't matter if one, or a million people, follow a process and trail of evidences to establish or prove something .

Descartes used this process to establish that he existed. Science uses a similar process to establish that all things exist, which do exist.

I agree, but conditionally. First condition is that what I argued was that only propositions which relate directly to the individual may be 'proven' true without external validation. Descartes proposition for the existence of self is the most recognisable example.

While I also accept that the existence of 'other' (or 'not-self') is also proven through this recognition of self, what cannot be proven is the nature of other, except where that nature is similar or identical to, the recognisable nature of self (i.e. that self is an identity, is conscious, etc.)

I don't know if you have read or heard Descartes proof in its entirety (and it is not nessecarily you do), because I am certain you are familiar with it, and I am also certain you know it was a common strategy in his day to prove things (God) ontologically. And, that this strategy is alive and well to this day. What he brought to the table was the desire to go beyond this and ask what can we know with absolute certainty, he put an intellectual solution into place to deal with this namely, Science/Religion. The interesting thing to me is we are all still asking questions using different strategies to answer them. Where once there was no distinction, now there is and we are still trying to answer Decartes original inquiry. What can we know for sure? With that being said, where I think you make a great point is how refreshing it would be if what we could/did know for sure was as simple as agreeing on a definition.

I'm not sure that "we are still trying to answer Descartes' original inquiry" is entirely accurate, but that we are still attempting to ascertain whether Descartes' own answer to his inquiry is true.

As for the matter of language in the application of knowledge, it is a given (imo) that all that we 'know' is down to the definition of what is 'known' being accepted. Take the word 'water'. It has a certain definition and in any language this definition is common. We 'know' water because we have a commonly agreed definition of what the word means.

Science does not change this 'knowing' except that it adds complexity. Those prehistoric humans who had no science still all 'knew' water, just without the complex knowledge of it that we today have.

We don't 'know' something before we define it, we define it before we can 'know' it.

eb,

Tricky thing language. I think is, arguably, something available to everybody. "I think" is observable by me alone. I try to support other people's inferences in that direction, but it is inference for them, and it has been faked, so there is no point discussing whether it can be. (As to I, if I recall, Hume reported a fair amount of difficulty finding his I-thingy, as did Gautama. Maybe this I isn't so obviously there as you think.)

With all due respect to Hume and Gautama, 'where do "I" reside?' or 'what am "I"?' are different questions to 'do "I" exist?'.

Descartes' proposition answered the latter, I believe, but says little regarding the former. It does prove, quite satisfactorily in my opinion, that "I" am "obviously there". Where "there" is is not really relevant to that, neither is "what" "I" am.

Edited October 22, 2014 by Leonardo

[Philangeli]

Descartes' proposition answered the latter, I believe, but says little regarding the former. It does prove, quite satisfactorily in my opinion, that "I" am "obviously there". Where "there" is is not really relevant to that, neither is "what" "I" am.

I agree. Looking at it slightly differently:

I am, therefore, I can think.

If I think, then I must be.

Thinking arises from a state of beingness or consciousness (however we define that state).

The statement itself is a thought, so you must be, in order to have that thought.

Edited October 22, 2014 by Philangeli

[danielost]

I agree. Looking at it slightly differently:

I am, therefore, I can think.

If I think, then I must be.

Thinking arises from a state of beingness or consciousness (however we define that state).

so since they don't think viruses don't exist.

[Philangeli]

so since they don't think viruses don't exist.

Thinking is not a prerequisite to being.

Descartes could easily have said - I eat therefore I am.

I doubt if a virus could create such a thought, so the fact that Descartes could, adds more weight to the proposition, 'I think therefore I am'.

And, yes, viruses do exist. Even Mormons do.

Edited October 22, 2014 by Philangeli

[Mr Walker]

I agree, but conditionally. First condition is that what I argued was that only propositions which relate directly to the individual may be 'proven' true without external validation. Descartes proposition for the existence of self is the most recognisable example.

While I also accept that the existence of 'other' (or 'not-self') is also proven through this recognition of self, what cannot be proven is the nature of other, except where that nature is similar or identical to, the recognisable nature of self (i.e. that self is an identity, is conscious, etc.)

yes I do disagree. If I prove a stone exists then it also exists for others, because the same proofs/evidences I apply are applicable to/by others. Thus if the stone exists for me, it also exists for all others and separate to and independent of any of us. First the stone exists and would exist even if no self aware life was there to see it,.and second there are proofs and evidences which can confirm this existence. All physically independent/existent things can be proven to exist, using the same form of evidences proofs logic etc

The nature, form and function, of all physically existent things is capable of being known and understood and proven, given sufficient data, and adequate tools of observation, measurement, and analysis.

[Mr Walker]

I agree. Looking at it slightly differently:

I am, therefore, I can think.

If I think, then I must be.

Thinking arises from a state of beingness or consciousness (however we define that state).

The statement itself is a thought, so you must be, in order to have that thought.

An even more accurate way of looking at it is "I am and thus I can think." We do not exist because we can think. We think because we exist. Thinking is conditional on existing, but existence is not conditional on thinking

[Leonardo]

so since they don't think viruses don't exist.

Not quite. Since they don't (to the best of our knowledge) think, a virus can't know it exists.

yes I do disagree. If I prove a stone exists then it also exists for others, because the same proofs/evidences I apply are applicable to/by others. Thus if the stone exists for me, it also exists for all others and separate to and independent of any of us. First the stone exists and would exist even if no self aware life was there to see it,.and second there are proofs and evidences which can confirm this existence. All physically independent/existent things can be proven to exist, using the same form of evidences proofs logic etc

The nature, form and function, of all physically existent things is capable of being known and understood and proven, given sufficient data, and adequate tools of observation, measurement, and analysis.

Who are these 'others' you suggest confirms the stone's existence? How do you know they 'exist' and/or aren't lying to you?

I am arguing that 'proof' (in this context) can only be personal.

[eight bits]

Leo

With all due respect to Hume and Gautama, 'where do "I" reside?' or 'what am "I"?' are different questions to 'do "I" exist?'.

Really? When the object of inquiry is God or the invisible dragon in my garage, many people are happy to go from "not being evident when sought" to "not very different from not existing at all."

As I have said repeatedly, the issue here is proof of something other than what has been assumed, not the possibly tautological nature of the conclusion (putting aisde Clinton's Conundrum, it isn't always obvious what is is), and not confident inference from evidence. Proof compels every Buddhist to say "Doh, Gautama should have realized that just to ask about himself meant he had a self." So far, we seem to be several Buddhists short of unanimity. I think the holdouts have a point. Proof is nobody thinking that holdouts could possibly have a point. That includes dead people who had read the proof, like Hume.

There's no huge literature on whether or not the Pythagorean Theorem is true (plenty about applying it wrong, though). That's what proof looks like: there is nothing more to say about the truth of what has been proven. Not even rebuttal of the holdouts: proof speaks for itself.

[danielost]

Not quite. Since they don't (to the best of our knowledge) think, a virus can't know it exists.

Who are these 'others' you suggest confirms the stone's existence? How do you know they 'exist' and/or aren't lying to you?

I am arguing that 'proof' (in this context) can only be personal.

good then i won't have to worry about a viral infection. i am getting tired of getting the flu anyways.

Edited October 22, 2014 by danielost

[Leonardo]

Leo

Really? When the object of inquiry is God or the invisible dragon in my garage, many people are happy to go from "not being evident when sought" to "not very different from not existing at all."

But trying to prove "not-self" is, once again, very different to trying to prove "self".

I cannot show Gautama he exists, but he could show himself. Neither can Gautama demonstrate to me he exists, but I can demonstrate to myself that I exist.

So, respectfully, I don't see that we are debating the same thing, which is why we appear to be unable to reach an agreement.

[danielost]

as i have said science has no proof of abiogenesis or macro-evolution.

[eight bits]

Leo

I cannot show Gautama he exists, but he could show himself.

Personal proof isn't demonstrative proof.

If you do exist, then you can know you exist, in the hallowed sense of knowing as "justified true belief." Also in the sense that Levi would suggest, that your non-existnece is not seriously possible (in your estimation).

You can prove it to yourself in a sense - some people pinch themselves, for example. Who pinched? Who got pinched? Who felt that? Great questions all, and great reasons to believe, but not even a down payment on a demonstration.

But if you could demonstrate it (think about the word), then you could demonstrate it to me, and you're telling me you can't. So you're telling me that you can't demonstrate it, full stop. And, as already mentioned, that this conversation takes place puts paid to proof. There is nothing to be said about a valid proof. No objections arise. No answers are given to the utternaces that purport to be objections. Nothing, not one word, is added. If it's proof. This isn't. Maybe it was adequate in the Seventeenth Century, but it isn't anymore.

Edited October 22, 2014 by eight bits

[Mr Walker]

Not quite. Since they don't (to the best of our knowledge) think, a virus can't know it exists.

Who are these 'others' you suggest confirms the stone's existence? How do you know they 'exist' and/or aren't lying to you?

I am arguing that 'proof' (in this context) can only be personal.

No I can prove the existence of others exist using science, and the logic capabilities given to humans by language. I can prove that they have, in general, the same interactive perceptions used by me to relate to my environment (some might be blind or colour blind or deaf, but in general we share exactly the same brain formation sensory organs etc.) We know this because we can share knowledge and understanding of concrete objects as well as constructed concepts. When I see an apple tree and show a picture of an apple tree (Or paris Hilton) to another human being, they see the same thing, and can thus learn to communicate with me, as we come to understand the labels we attach to objects and ideas.

I can thus know that the stone (and the tree and paris Hilton) exists to them as well as to me. To argue otherwise is like arguing for creationism rather than evolution, because we cant be certain that the proofs of evolution are real.

[Mr Walker]

Leo

Personal proof isn't demonstrative proof.

If you do exist, then you can know you exist, in the hallowed sense of knowing as "justified true belief." Also in the sense that Levi would suggest, that your non-existnece is not seriously possible (in your estimation).

You can prove it to yourself in a sense - some people pinch themselves, for example. Who pinched? Who got pinched? Who felt that? Great questions all, and great reasons to believe, but not even a down payment on a demonstration.

But if you could demonstrate it (think about the word), then you could demonstrate it to me, and you're telling me you can't. So you're telling me that you can't demonstrate it, full stop. And, as already mentioned, that this conversation takes place puts paid to proof. There is nothing to be said about a valid proof. No objections arise. No answers are given to the utternaces that purport to be objections. Nothing, not one word, is added. If it's proof. This isn't. Maybe it was adequate in the Seventeenth Century, but it isn't anymore.

I am not sure of your terms but, to me, personal proof is the only true form of proof, and thus of demonstrative proof. We can only truly know the things we experience for ourselves. But where we experience/ perceive exactly what other people experience or perceive (either collectively or separately across time and space) then we establish a common reality. It is not enough to read about two other peoples similar experiences, to be able to know something or share that common reality. (or a million other peoples') To KNOW, rather than believe in faith, one has to also have had a similar experience . True knowing is more than justified true belief, which encompasses those acts of faith in the personally unexperienced realities of other people Ie in my understanding justified true belief is believing in something with justification, particularly where the belief is/happens to be, actually the truth

It was a while ago but I thing Gettier disproved Plato's definition of justified true belief being an "acceptable" form of knowing.

Edited October 22, 2014 by Mr Walker